Guide to the Secure Configuration of Fedora

with profile OSPP - Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems
This profile reflects mandatory configuration controls identified in the NIAP Configuration Annex to the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems (Protection Profile Version 4.2). As Fedora OS is moving target, this profile does not guarantee to provide security levels required from US National Security Systems. Main goal of the profile is to provide Fedora developers with hardened environment similar to the one mandated by US National Security Systems.
The SCAP Security Guide Project
https://www.open-scap.org/security-policies/scap-security-guide
This guide presents a catalog of security-relevant configuration settings for Fedora. It is a rendering of content structured in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) in order to support security automation. The SCAP content is is available in the scap-security-guide package which is developed at https://www.open-scap.org/security-policies/scap-security-guide.

Providing system administrators with such guidance informs them how to securely configure systems under their control in a variety of network roles. Policy makers and baseline creators can use this catalog of settings, with its associated references to higher-level security control catalogs, in order to assist them in security baseline creation. This guide is a catalog, not a checklist, and satisfaction of every item is not likely to be possible or sensible in many operational scenarios. However, the XCCDF format enables granular selection and adjustment of settings, and their association with OVAL and OCIL content provides an automated checking capability. Transformations of this document, and its associated automated checking content, are capable of providing baselines that meet a diverse set of policy objectives. Some example XCCDF Profiles, which are selections of items that form checklists and can be used as baselines, are available with this guide. They can be processed, in an automated fashion, with tools that support the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP). The DISA STIG, which provides required settings for US Department of Defense systems, is one example of a baseline created from this guidance.
Do not attempt to implement any of the settings in this guide without first testing them in a non-operational environment. The creators of this guidance assume no responsibility whatsoever for its use by other parties, and makes no guarantees, expressed or implied, about its quality, reliability, or any other characteristic.

Profile Information

Profile TitleOSPP - Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems
Profile IDxccdf_org.ssgproject.content_profile_ospp

CPE Platforms

  • cpe:/o:fedoraproject:fedora:35
  • cpe:/o:fedoraproject:fedora:36
  • cpe:/o:fedoraproject:fedora:37
  • cpe:/o:fedoraproject:fedora:38

Revision History

Current version: 0.1.66

  • draft (as of 2023-02-03)

Table of Contents

  1. System Settings
    1. Installing and Maintaining Software
    2. Account and Access Control
    3. System Accounting with auditd
    4. GRUB2 bootloader configuration
    5. Configure Syslog
    6. Network Configuration and Firewalls
    7. File Permissions and Masks
    8. SELinux
  2. Services
    1. Base Services
    2. Application Whitelisting Daemon
    3. Mail Server Software
    4. Network Time Protocol
    5. Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Daemon
    6. SSH Server
    7. System Security Services Daemon

Checklist

Group   Guide to the Secure Configuration of Fedora   Group contains 62 groups and 206 rules
Group   System Settings   Group contains 52 groups and 192 rules
[ref]   Contains rules that check correct system settings.
Group   Installing and Maintaining Software   Group contains 10 groups and 29 rules
[ref]   The following sections contain information on security-relevant choices during the initial operating system installation process and the setup of software updates.
Group   System and Software Integrity   Group contains 5 groups and 9 rules
[ref]   System and software integrity can be gained by installing antivirus, increasing system encryption strength with FIPS, verifying installed software, enabling SELinux, installing an Intrusion Prevention System, etc. However, installing or enabling integrity checking tools cannot prevent intrusions, but they can detect that an intrusion may have occurred. Requirements for integrity checking may be highly dependent on the environment in which the system will be used. Snapshot-based approaches such as AIDE may induce considerable overhead in the presence of frequent software updates.
Group   Software Integrity Checking   Group contains 1 group and 1 rule
[ref]   Both the AIDE (Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment) software and the RPM package management system provide mechanisms for verifying the integrity of installed software. AIDE uses snapshots of file metadata (such as hashes) and compares these to current system files in order to detect changes.

The RPM package management system can conduct integrity checks by comparing information in its metadata database with files installed on the system.
Group   Verify Integrity with RPM   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   The RPM package management system includes the ability to verify the integrity of installed packages by comparing the installed files with information about the files taken from the package metadata stored in the RPM database. Although an attacker could corrupt the RPM database (analogous to attacking the AIDE database as described above), this check can still reveal modification of important files. To list which files on the system differ from what is expected by the RPM database: 
$ rpm -qVa
See the man page for rpm to see a complete explanation of each column.

Rule   Verify File Hashes with RPM   [ref]

Without cryptographic integrity protections, system executables and files can be altered by unauthorized users without detection. The RPM package management system can check the hashes of installed software packages, including many that are important to system security. To verify that the cryptographic hash of system files and commands matches vendor values, run the following command to list which files on the system have hashes that differ from what is expected by the RPM database: 
$ rpm -Va --noconfig | grep '^..5'
A "c" in the second column indicates that a file is a configuration file, which may appropriately be expected to change. If the file was not expected to change, investigate the cause of the change using audit logs or other means. The package can then be reinstalled to restore the file. Run the following command to determine which package owns the file: 
$ rpm -qf FILENAME
The package can be reinstalled from a dnf repository using the command: 
$ sudo dnf reinstall PACKAGENAME
Alternatively, the package can be reinstalled from trusted media using the command: 
$ sudo rpm -Uvh PACKAGENAME
Rationale:
The hashes of important files like system executables should match the information given by the RPM database. Executables with erroneous hashes could be a sign of nefarious activity on the system.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_rpm_verify_hashes
Identifiers and References

References:  11, 2, 3, 9, 5.10.4.1, APO01.06, BAI03.05, BAI06.01, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS06.02, 3.3.8, 3.4.1, CCI-000366, CCI-001749, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.312(b), 164.312(c)(1), 164.312(c)(2), 164.312(e)(2)(i), 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.3.4.4.4, SR 3.1, SR 3.3, SR 3.4, SR 3.8, SR 7.6, A.11.2.4, A.12.1.2, A.12.2.1, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, CM-6(d), CM-6(c), SI-7, SI-7(1), SI-7(6), AU-9(3), PR.DS-6, PR.DS-8, PR.IP-1, Req-11.5, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227


Complexity:high
Disruption:medium
Strategy:restrict
- name: 'Set fact: Package manager reinstall command (dnf)'
  set_fact:
    package_manager_reinstall_cmd: dnf reinstall -y
  when: ansible_distribution == "Fedora"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.8
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.1
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5
  - high_complexity
  - high_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - rpm_verify_hashes

- name: 'Set fact: Package manager reinstall command (yum)'
  set_fact:
    package_manager_reinstall_cmd: yum reinstall -y
  when: (ansible_distribution == "RedHat" or ansible_distribution == "CentOS" or ansible_distribution
    == "OracleLinux")
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.8
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.1
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5
  - high_complexity
  - high_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - rpm_verify_hashes

- name: 'Set fact: Package manager reinstall command (zypper)'
  set_fact:
    package_manager_reinstall_cmd: zypper in -f -y
  when: ansible_distribution == "SLES"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.8
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.1
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5
  - high_complexity
  - high_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - rpm_verify_hashes

- name: Read files with incorrect hash
  command: rpm -Va --nodeps --nosize --nomtime --nordev --nocaps --nolinkto --nouser
    --nogroup --nomode --noghost --noconfig
  register: files_with_incorrect_hash
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: files_with_incorrect_hash.rc > 1
  check_mode: false
  when: (package_manager_reinstall_cmd is defined)
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.8
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.1
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5
  - high_complexity
  - high_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - rpm_verify_hashes

- name: Create list of packages
  command: rpm -qf "{{ item }}"
  with_items: '{{ files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines | map(''regex_findall'',
    ''^[.]+[5]+.* (\/.*)'', ''\1'') | map(''join'') | select(''match'', ''(\/.*)'')
    | list | unique }}'
  register: list_of_packages
  changed_when: false
  check_mode: false
  when:
  - files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines is defined
  - (files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines | length > 0)
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.8
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.1
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5
  - high_complexity
  - high_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - rpm_verify_hashes

- name: Reinstall packages of files with incorrect hash
  command: '{{ package_manager_reinstall_cmd }} ''{{ item }}'''
  with_items: '{{ list_of_packages.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list
    | unique }}'
  when:
  - files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines is defined
  - (package_manager_reinstall_cmd is defined and (files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines
    | length > 0))
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.8
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.1
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5
  - high_complexity
  - high_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - rpm_verify_hashes



# Find which files have incorrect hash (not in /etc, because of the system related config files) and then get files names
files_with_incorrect_hash="$(rpm -Va --noconfig | grep -E '^..5' | awk '{print $NF}' )"

# From files names get package names and change newline to space, because rpm writes each package to new line
packages_to_reinstall="$(rpm -qf $files_with_incorrect_hash | tr '\n' ' ')"


dnf reinstall -y $packages_to_reinstall
Group   Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) is a computer security standard which is developed by the U.S. Government and industry working groups to validate the quality of cryptographic modules. The FIPS standard provides four security levels to ensure adequate coverage of different industries, implementation of cryptographic modules, and organizational sizes and requirements.

FIPS 140-2 is the current standard for validating that mechanisms used to access cryptographic modules utilize authentication that meets industry and government requirements. For government systems, this allows Security Levels 1, 2, 3, or 4 for use on Fedora.

See http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html for more information.

Rule   Enable FIPS Mode   [ref]

To enable FIPS mode, run the following command: 
fips-mode-setup --enable

The fips-mode-setup command will configure the system in FIPS mode by automatically configuring the following:
  • Setting the kernel FIPS mode flag (/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled) to 1
  • Creating /etc/system-fips
  • Setting the system crypto policy in /etc/crypto-policies/config to FIPS
  • Loading the Dracut fips module
Warning:  The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect.
Warning:  This rule DOES NOT CHECK if the components of the operating system are FIPS certified. You can find the list of FIPS certified modules at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules/search. This rule checks if the system is running in FIPS mode. See the rule description for more information about what it means.
Rationale:
Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The operating system must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_enable_fips_mode
Identifiers and References

References:  CCI-000068, CCI-000803, CCI-002450, 1446, CIP-003-8 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CM-3(6), SC-12(2), SC-12(3), IA-7, SC-13, CM-6(a), SC-12, FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000478-GPOS-00223, SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176, SRG-OS-000120-VMM-000600, SRG-OS-000478-VMM-001980, SRG-OS-000396-VMM-001590


Complexity:medium
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: XCCDF Value var_system_crypto_policy # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_system_crypto_policy: !!str FIPS
  tags:
    - always

- name: Check to see the current status of FIPS mode
  command: /usr/bin/fips-mode-setup --check
  register: is_fips_enabled
  changed_when: false
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-7
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - enable_fips_mode
  - high_severity
  - medium_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Enable FIPS mode
  command: /usr/bin/fips-mode-setup --enable
  when:
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - is_fips_enabled.stdout.find('FIPS mode is enabled.') == -1
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-7
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - enable_fips_mode
  - high_severity
  - medium_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Enable FIPS Mode
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/crypto-policies/config
    regexp: ^(?!#)(\S+)$
    line: '{{ var_system_crypto_policy }}'
    create: true
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-7
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - enable_fips_mode
  - high_severity
  - medium_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Verify that Crypto Policy is Set (runtime)
  command: /usr/bin/update-crypto-policies --set {{ var_system_crypto_policy }}
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-7
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - enable_fips_mode
  - high_severity
  - medium_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then

var_system_crypto_policy='FIPS'


fips-mode-setup --enable

stderr_of_call=$(update-crypto-policies --set ${var_system_crypto_policy} 2>&1 > /dev/null)
rc=$?

if test "$rc" = 127; then
	echo "$stderr_of_call" >&2
	echo "Make sure that the script is installed on the remediated system." >&2
	echo "See output of the 'dnf provides update-crypto-policies' command" >&2
	echo "to see what package to (re)install" >&2

	false  # end with an error code
elif test "$rc" != 0; then
	echo "Error invoking the update-crypto-policies script: $stderr_of_call" >&2
	false  # end with an error code
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi
Group   System Cryptographic Policies   Group contains 6 rules
[ref]   Linux has the capability to centrally configure cryptographic polices. The command update-crypto-policies is used to set the policy applicable for the various cryptographic back-ends, such as SSL/TLS libraries. The configured cryptographic policies will be the default policy used by these backends unless the application user configures them otherwise. When the system has been configured to use the centralized cryptographic policies, the administrator is assured that any application that utilizes the supported backends will follow a policy that adheres to the configured profile. Currently the supported backends are:
  • GnuTLS library
  • OpenSSL library
  • NSS library
  • OpenJDK
  • Libkrb5
  • BIND
  • OpenSSH
Applications and languages which rely on any of these backends will follow the system policies as well. Examples are apache httpd, nginx, php, and others.

Rule   Configure BIND to use System Crypto Policy   [ref]

Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. BIND is supported by crypto policy, but the BIND configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that the /etc/named.conf includes the appropriate configuration: In the options section of /etc/named.conf, make sure that the following line is not commented out or superseded by later includes: include "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config";
Rationale:
Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the BIND service violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_configure_bind_crypto_policy
Identifiers and References

References:  CIP-003-8 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1, SC-13, SC-12(2), SC-12(3), SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187, SRG-OS-000426-GPOS-00190



function remediate_bind_crypto_policy() {
	CONFIG_FILE="/etc/named.conf"
	if test -f "$CONFIG_FILE"; then
		sed -i 's|options {|&\n\tinclude "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config";|' "$CONFIG_FILE"
		return 0
	else
		echo "Aborting remediation as '$CONFIG_FILE' was not even found." >&2
		return 1
	fi
}

remediate_bind_crypto_policy

Rule   Configure System Cryptography Policy   [ref]

To configure the system cryptography policy to use ciphers only from the FIPS policy, run the following command: 
$ sudo update-crypto-policies --set FIPS
The rule checks if settings for selected crypto policy are configured as expected. Configuration files in the /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends are either symlinks to correct files provided by Crypto-policies package or they are regular files in case crypto policy customizations are applied. Crypto policies may be customized by crypto policy modules, in which case it is delimited from the base policy using a colon.
Warning:  The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect.
Warning:  System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process.
Rationale:
Centralized cryptographic policies simplify applying secure ciphers across an operating system and the applications that run on that operating system. Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_configure_crypto_policy
Identifiers and References

References:  164.308(a)(4)(i), 164.308(b)(1), 164.308(b)(3), 164.312(e)(1), 164.312(e)(2)(ii), 1446, CIP-003-8 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R7.1, AC-17(a), AC-17(2), CM-6(a), MA-4(6), SC-13, SC-12(2), SC-12(3), FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176, SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173, SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    systemd:
      units:
        - name: configure-crypto-policy.service
          enabled: true
          contents: |
            [Unit]
            Before=kubelet.service
            [Service]
            Type=oneshot
            ExecStart=update-crypto-policies --set {{.var_system_crypto_policy}}
            RemainAfterExit=yes
            [Install]
            WantedBy=multi-user.target

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: XCCDF Value var_system_crypto_policy # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_system_crypto_policy: !!str FIPS
  tags:
    - always

- name: Configure System Cryptography Policy
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/crypto-policies/config
    regexp: ^(?!#)(\S+)$
    line: '{{ var_system_crypto_policy }}'
    create: true
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - configure_crypto_policy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Verify that Crypto Policy is Set (runtime)
  command: /usr/bin/update-crypto-policies --set {{ var_system_crypto_policy }}
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - configure_crypto_policy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy



var_system_crypto_policy='FIPS'


stderr_of_call=$(update-crypto-policies --set ${var_system_crypto_policy} 2>&1 > /dev/null)
rc=$?

if test "$rc" = 127; then
	echo "$stderr_of_call" >&2
	echo "Make sure that the script is installed on the remediated system." >&2
	echo "See output of the 'dnf provides update-crypto-policies' command" >&2
	echo "to see what package to (re)install" >&2

	false  # end with an error code
elif test "$rc" != 0; then
	echo "Error invoking the update-crypto-policies script: $stderr_of_call" >&2
	false  # end with an error code
fi

Rule   Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy   [ref]

Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. Kerberos is supported by crypto policy, but it's configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings for Kerberos are configured correctly, examine that there is a symlink at /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies targeting /etc/cypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config. If the symlink exists, Kerberos is configured to use the system-wide crypto policy settings.
Rationale:
Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of Kerberos violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_configure_kerberos_crypto_policy
Identifiers and References

References:  0418, 1055, 1402, CIP-003-8 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1, SC-13, SC-12(2), SC-12(3), SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:configure
- name: Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy
  file:
    src: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config
    path: /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies
    state: link
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - configure_kerberos_crypto_policy
  - configure_strategy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - reboot_required

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:configure

rm -f /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies
ln -s /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies

Rule   Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy   [ref]

Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. Libreswan is supported by system crypto policy, but the Libreswan configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that the /etc/ipsec.conf includes the appropriate configuration file. In /etc/ipsec.conf, make sure that the following line is not commented out or superseded by later includes: include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config
Rationale:
Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the Libreswan service violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_configure_libreswan_crypto_policy
Identifiers and References

References:  CIP-003-8 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CM-6(a), MA-4(6), SC-13, SC-12(2), SC-12(3), FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6, Req-2.2, SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/ipsec.conf
    line: include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config
    create: true
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2
  - configure_libreswan_crypto_policy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy



function remediate_libreswan_crypto_policy() {
    CONFIG_FILE="/etc/ipsec.conf"
    if ! grep -qP "^\s*include\s+/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config\s*(?:#.*)?$" "$CONFIG_FILE" ; then
        # the file might not end with a new line
        echo -e '\ninclude /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config' >> "$CONFIG_FILE"
    fi
    return 0
}

remediate_libreswan_crypto_policy

Rule   Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy   [ref]

Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. OpenSSL is supported by crypto policy, but the OpenSSL configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, you have to examine the OpenSSL config file available under /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf. This file has the ini format, and it enables crypto policy support if there is a [ crypto_policy ] section that contains the .include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config directive.
Rationale:
Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the Java runtime violates expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_configure_openssl_crypto_policy
Identifiers and References

References:  CCI-001453, CIP-003-8 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R7.1, AC-17(a), AC-17(2), CM-6(a), MA-4(6), SC-13, SC-12(2), SC-12(3), Req-2.2, SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Test for crypto_policy group
  command: grep '^\s*\[\s*crypto_policy\s*]' /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
  register: test_crypto_policy_group
  ignore_errors: true
  changed_when: false
  check_mode: false
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2
  - configure_openssl_crypto_policy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Add .include for opensslcnf.config to crypto_policy section
  lineinfile:
    create: true
    insertafter: ^\s*\[\s*crypto_policy\s*]\s*
    line: .include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
    path: /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
  when:
  - test_crypto_policy_group.stdout is defined
  - test_crypto_policy_group.stdout | length > 0
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2
  - configure_openssl_crypto_policy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Add crypto_policy group and set include opensslcnf.config
  lineinfile:
    create: true
    line: |-
      [crypto_policy]
      .include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
    path: /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
  when:
  - test_crypto_policy_group.stdout is defined
  - test_crypto_policy_group.stdout | length < 1
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2
  - configure_openssl_crypto_policy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy



OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION='[ crypto_policy ]'
OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION_REGEX='\[\s*crypto_policy\s*\]'
OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION='.include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config'
OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION_REGEX='^\s*\.include\s*(?:=\s*)?/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config$'


  


function remediate_openssl_crypto_policy() {
	CONFIG_FILE=/etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
	if test -f "$CONFIG_FILE"; then
		if ! grep -q "^\\s*$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION_REGEX" "$CONFIG_FILE"; then
			printf '\n%s\n\n%s' "$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION" "$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION" >> "$CONFIG_FILE"
			return 0
		elif ! grep -q "^\\s*$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION_REGEX" "$CONFIG_FILE"; then
			sed -i "s|$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION_REGEX|&\\n\\n$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION\\n|" "$CONFIG_FILE"
			return 0
		fi
	else
		echo "Aborting remediation as '$CONFIG_FILE' was not even found." >&2
		return 1
	fi
}

remediate_openssl_crypto_policy

Rule   Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy   [ref]

Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. SSH is supported by crypto policy, but the SSH configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that the CRYPTO_POLICY variable is either commented or not set at all in the /etc/sysconfig/sshd.
Rationale:
Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the SSH service violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_configure_ssh_crypto_policy
Identifiers and References

References:  CCI-001453, 164.308(a)(4)(i), 164.308(b)(1), 164.308(b)(3), 164.312(e)(1), 164.312(e)(2)(ii), CIP-003-8 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R7.1, AC-17(a), AC-17(2), CM-6(a), MA-4(6), SC-13, FCS_SSH_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1, Req-2.2, SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy
  lineinfile:
    dest: /etc/sysconfig/sshd
    state: absent
    regexp: ^\s*(?i)CRYPTO_POLICY.*$
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2
  - configure_ssh_crypto_policy
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required



SSH_CONF="/etc/sysconfig/sshd"

sed -i "/^\s*CRYPTO_POLICY.*$/Id" $SSH_CONF
Group   Operating System Vendor Support and Certification   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   The assurance of a vendor to provide operating system support and maintenance for their product is an important criterion to ensure product stability and security over the life of the product. A certified product that follows the necessary standards and government certification requirements guarantees that known software vulnerabilities will be remediated, and proper guidance for protecting and securing the operating system will be given.

Rule   The Installed Operating System Is Vendor Supported   [ref]

The installed operating system must be maintained by a vendor. Red Hat Enterprise Linux is supported by Red Hat, Inc. As the Red Hat Enterprise Linux vendor, Red Hat, Inc. is responsible for providing security patches.
Warning:  There is no remediation besides switching to a different operating system.
Rationale:
An operating system is considered "supported" if the vendor continues to provide security patches for the product. With an unsupported release, it will not be possible to resolve any security issue discovered in the system software.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_installed_OS_is_vendor_supported
Identifiers and References

References:  18, 20, 4, APO12.01, APO12.02, APO12.03, APO12.04, BAI03.10, DSS05.01, DSS05.02, CCI-000366, 4.2.3, 4.2.3.12, 4.2.3.7, 4.2.3.9, A.12.6.1, A.14.2.3, A.16.1.3, A.18.2.2, A.18.2.3, CM-6(a), MA-6, SA-13(a), ID.RA-1, PR.IP-12, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227

Group   GNOME Desktop Environment   Group contains 2 groups and 12 rules
[ref]   GNOME is a graphical desktop environment bundled with many Linux distributions that allow users to easily interact with the operating system graphically rather than textually. The GNOME Graphical Display Manager (GDM) provides login, logout, and user switching contexts as well as display server management.

GNOME is developed by the GNOME Project and is considered the default Red Hat Graphical environment.

For more information on GNOME and the GNOME Project, see https://www.gnome.org.
Group   Configure GNOME Login Screen   Group contains 3 rules
Group   Configure GNOME Screen Locking   Group contains 8 rules
[ref]   In the default GNOME3 desktop, the screen can be locked by selecting the user name in the far right corner of the main panel and selecting Lock.

The following sections detail commands to enforce idle activation of the screensaver, screen locking, a blank-screen screensaver, and an idle activation time.

Because users should be trained to lock the screen when they step away from the computer, the automatic locking feature is only meant as a backup.

The root account can be screen-locked; however, the root account should never be used to log into an X Windows environment and should only be used to for direct login via console in emergency circumstances.

For more information about enforcing preferences in the GNOME3 environment using the DConf configuration system, see http://wiki.gnome.org/dconf and the man page dconf(1).

Rule   Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation   [ref]

To activate the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop after a period of inactivity, add or set idle-activation-enabled to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]
idle-activation-enabled=true
Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock.

Enabling idle activation of the screensaver ensures the screensaver will be activated after the idle delay. Applications requiring continuous, real-time screen display (such as network management products) require the login session does not have administrator rights and the display station is located in a controlled-access area.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, 5.5.5, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.10, CCI-000057, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), AC-11(a), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, Req-8.1.8, SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver
    option: idle-activation-enabled
    value: 'true'
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME idle-activation-enabled
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$
    line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*idle-activation-enabled\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)idle-activation-enabled(\s*=)/#\1idle-activation-enabled\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi


[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")"
if grep -q "^\\s*idle-activation-enabled\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*idle-activation-enabled\\s*=\\s*.*/idle-activation-enabled=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\idle-activation-enabled=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi

dconf update
# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout   [ref]

The idle time-out value for inactivity in the GNOME3 desktop is configured via the idle-delay setting must be set under an appropriate configuration file(s) in the /etc/dconf/db/local.d directory and locked in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks directory to prevent user modification.

For example, to configure the system for a 15 minute delay, add the following to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings: 
[org/gnome/desktop/session]
idle-delay=uint32 900
Rationale:
A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME3 can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate a session lock.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, 5.5.5, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.10, CCI-000057, CCI-000060, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, AC-11(a), CM-6(a), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, Req-8.1.8, SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010, SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value inactivity_timeout_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    inactivity_timeout_value: !!str 900
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/session
    option: idle-delay
    value: uint32 {{ inactivity_timeout_value }}
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

inactivity_timeout_value='900'


# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*idle-delay\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)idle-delay(\s*=)/#\1idle-delay\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi


[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/session]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "uint32 ${inactivity_timeout_value}")"
if grep -q "^\\s*idle-delay\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*idle-delay\\s*=\\s*.*/idle-delay=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]|a\\idle-delay=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period   [ref]

To activate the locking delay of the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop when the screensaver is activated, add or set lock-delay to uint32 0 in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]
lock-delay=uint32 0
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.10, CCI-000056, CCI-000057, CCI-000060, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, AC-11(a), CM-6(a), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, Req-8.1.8, SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010, SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_screensaver_lock_delay # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_screensaver_lock_delay: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver
    option: lock-delay
    value: uint32 {{ var_screensaver_lock_delay }}
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

var_screensaver_lock_delay='0'


# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*lock-delay\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)lock-delay(\s*=)/#\1lock-delay\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi


[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "uint32 ${var_screensaver_lock_delay}")"
if grep -q "^\\s*lock-delay\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*lock-delay\\s*=\\s*.*/lock-delay=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\lock-delay=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period   [ref]

To activate locking of the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop when it is activated, add or set lock-enabled to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]
lock-enabled=true
Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, 5.5.5, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.10, CCI-000056, CCI-000058, CCI-000060, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, Req-8.1.8, SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009, SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_distribution == 'SLES'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver
    option: lock-enabled
    value: 'true'
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_distribution != 'SLES'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME lock-enabled
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$
    line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_distribution != 'SLES'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/lockdown
    option: disable-lock-screen
    value: 'false'
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_distribution == 'SLES'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME disable-lock-screen
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/disable-lock-screen$
    line: /org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/disable-lock-screen
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_distribution == 'SLES'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Check GNOME3 screenserver disable-lock-screen false
  command: gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.lockdown disable-lock-screen
  register: cmd_out
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_distribution == 'SLES'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Update GNOME3 screenserver disable-lock-screen false
  command: gsettings set org.gnome.desktop.lockdown disable-lock-screen false
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_distribution == 'SLES'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*lock-enabled\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)lock-enabled(\s*=)/#\1lock-enabled\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi


[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")"
if grep -q "^\\s*lock-enabled\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*lock-enabled\\s*=\\s*.*/lock-enabled=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\lock-enabled=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi

dconf update
# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Implement Blank Screensaver   [ref]

To set the screensaver mode in the GNOME3 desktop to a blank screen, add or set picture-uri to string '' in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]
picture-uri=string ''
Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
Setting the screensaver mode to blank-only conceals the contents of the display from passersby.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, 5.5.5, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.10, CCI-000060, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, AC-11(1), CM-6(a), AC-11(1).1, PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, Req-8.1.8, SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Implement Blank Screensaver
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver
    option: picture-uri
    value: string ''
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME picture-uri
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$
    line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*picture-uri\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)picture-uri(\s*=)/#\1picture-uri\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi


[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "string ''")"
if grep -q "^\\s*picture-uri\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*picture-uri\\s*=\\s*.*/picture-uri=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\picture-uri=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi

dconf update
# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Settings   [ref]

If not already configured, ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 screensaver lock settings by adding /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock. As such, users should not be allowed to change session settings.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.10, CCI-000057, CCI-000060, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010, SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME lock-delay
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$
    line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Session Idle Settings   [ref]

If not already configured, ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 session idle settings by adding /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock. As such, users should not be allowed to change session settings.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.10, CCI-000057, CCI-000060, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, Req-8.1.8, SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010, SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME Session idle-delay
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$
    line: /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles   [ref]

By default, DConf uses a binary database as a data backend. The system-level database is compiled from keyfiles in the /etc/dconf/db/ directory by the 
dconf update
command. More specifically, content present in the following directories: 
/etc/dconf/db/distro.d
/etc/dconf/db/local.d
Rationale:
Unlike text-based keyfiles, the binary database is impossible to check by OVAL. Therefore, in order to evaluate dconf configuration, both have to be true at the same time - configuration files have to be compliant, and the database needs to be more recent than those keyfiles, which gives confidence that it reflects them.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_db_up_to_date
Identifiers and References

References:  164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A), Req-6.2, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi
Group   Updating Software   Group contains 8 rules
[ref]   The dnf command line tool is used to install and update software packages. The system also provides a graphical software update tool in the System menu, in the Administration submenu, called Software Update.

Fedora systems contain an installed software catalog called the RPM database, which records metadata of installed packages. Consistently using dnf or the graphical Software Update for all software installation allows for insight into the current inventory of installed software on the system.

Rule   Install dnf-automatic Package   [ref]

The dnf-automatic package can be installed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf install dnf-automatic
Rationale:
dnf-automatic is an alternative command line interface (CLI) to dnf upgrade suitable for automatic, regular execution.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_dnf-automatic_installed
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R8), SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable
include install_dnf-automatic

class install_dnf-automatic {
  package { 'dnf-automatic':
    ensure => 'installed',
  }
}

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable

package --add=dnf-automatic



[[packages]]
name = "dnf-automatic"
version = "*"

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable
- name: Ensure dnf-automatic is installed
  package:
    name: dnf-automatic
    state: present
  tags:
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_dnf-automatic_installed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable

if ! rpm -q --quiet "dnf-automatic" ; then
    dnf install -y "dnf-automatic"
fi

Rule   Configure dnf-automatic to Install Available Updates Automatically   [ref]

To ensure that the packages comprising the available updates will be automatically installed by dnf-automatic, set apply_updates to yes under [commands] section in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf.
Rationale:
Installing software updates is a fundamental mitigation against the exploitation of publicly-known vulnerabilities. If the most recent security patches and updates are not installed, unauthorized users may take advantage of weaknesses in the unpatched software. The lack of prompt attention to patching could result in a system compromise. The automated installation of updates ensures that recent security patches are applied in a timely manner.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dnf-automatic_apply_updates
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R8), 0940, 1144, 1467, 1472, 1483, 1493, 1494, 1495, SI-2(5), CM-6(a), SI-2(c), FMT_SMF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Configure dnf-automatic to Install Available Updates Automatically
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dnf/automatic.conf
    section: commands
    option: apply_updates
    value: 'yes'
    create: true
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-2(5)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-2(c)
  - dnf-automatic_apply_updates
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy



found=false

# set value in all files if they contain section or key
for f in $(echo -n "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf"); do
    if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then
        continue
    fi

    # find key in section and change value
    if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*apply_updates" "$f"; then
            sed -i "s/apply_updates[^(\n)]*/apply_updates = yes/" "$f"
            found=true

    # find section and add key = value to it
    elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]" "$f"; then
            sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[commands\]/a apply_updates = yes" "$f"
            found=true
    fi
done

# if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter
if ! $found ; then
    file=$(echo "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ')
    mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")"
    echo -e "[commands]\napply_updates = yes" >> "$file"
fi

Rule   Configure dnf-automatic to Install Only Security Updates   [ref]

To configure dnf-automatic to install only security updates automatically, set upgrade_type to security under [commands] section in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf.
Rationale:
By default, dnf-automatic installs all available updates. Reducing the amount of updated packages only to updates that were issued as a part of a security advisory increases the system stability.
Severity: 
low
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dnf-automatic_security_updates_only
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R8), SI-2(5), CM-6(a), SI-2(c), FMT_SMF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Configure dnf-automatic to Install Only Security Updates
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dnf/automatic.conf
    section: commands
    option: upgrade_type
    value: security
    create: true
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-2(5)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-2(c)
  - dnf-automatic_security_updates_only
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy



found=false

# set value in all files if they contain section or key
for f in $(echo -n "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf"); do
    if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then
        continue
    fi

    # find key in section and change value
    if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*upgrade_type" "$f"; then
            sed -i "s/upgrade_type[^(\n)]*/upgrade_type = security/" "$f"
            found=true

    # find section and add key = value to it
    elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]" "$f"; then
            sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[commands\]/a upgrade_type = security" "$f"
            found=true
    fi
done

# if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter
if ! $found ; then
    file=$(echo "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ')
    mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")"
    echo -e "[commands]\nupgrade_type = security" >> "$file"
fi

Rule   Ensure Fedora GPG Key Installed   [ref]

To ensure the system can cryptographically verify base software packages come from Fedora (and to connect to the Fedora Network to receive them), the Fedora GPG key must properly be installed. To install the Fedora GPG key, run one of the commands below, depending on your Fedora vesion: 
$ sudo rpm --import /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-fedora-36-primary
" 
$ sudo rpm --import /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-fedora-35-primary
"
Rationale:
Changes to software components can have significant effects on the overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. The Fedora GPG key is necessary to cryptographically verify packages are from Fedora."
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_ensure_fedora_gpgkey_installed
Identifiers and References

References:  11, 2, 3, 9, 5.10.4.1, APO01.06, BAI03.05, BAI06.01, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS06.02, 3.4.8, CCI-001749, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.312(b), 164.312(c)(1), 164.312(c)(2), 164.312(e)(2)(i), 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.3.4.4.4, SR 3.1, SR 3.3, SR 3.4, SR 3.8, SR 7.6, A.11.2.4, A.12.1.2, A.12.2.1, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, CM-5(3), SI-7, SC-12, SC-12(3), CM-6(a), PR.DS-6, PR.DS-8, PR.IP-1, Req-6.2



dnf install -y gpg

fedora_version=$(grep -oP '[[:digit:]]+' /etc/redhat-release)

function get_release_fingerprint {
    if [ "${fedora_version}" -eq "38" ]; then
        readonly FEDORA_RELEASE_FINGERPRINT="6A51BBABBA3D5467B6171221809A8D7CEB10B464"
    elif [ "${fedora_version}" -eq "36" ]; then
        readonly FEDORA_RELEASE_FINGERPRINT="53DED2CB922D8B8D9E63FD18999F7CBF38AB71F4"
    elif [ "${fedora_version}" -eq "35" ]; then
        readonly FEDORA_RELEASE_FINGERPRINT="787EA6AE1147EEE56C40B30CDB4639719867C58F"
    elif [ "${fedora_version}" -eq "37" ]; then
        readonly FEDORA_RELEASE_FINGERPRINT="ACB5EE4E831C74BB7C168D27F55AD3FB5323552A"
    else
        printf '%s\n' "This Fedora version '$fedora_version' is not supported anymore, please upgrade to a newer version." >&2
        return 1
    fi
}

# Location of the key we would like to import (once it's integrity verified)
readonly REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY="/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-fedora-${fedora_version}-primary"

RPM_GPG_DIR_PERMS=$(stat -c %a "$(dirname "$REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY")")

function remediate_gpgkey_installed {
    # Return if there was an issue getting the release fingerprint
    get_release_fingerprint || return 1
    # Verify /etc/pki/rpm-gpg directory permissions are safe
    if [ "${RPM_GPG_DIR_PERMS}" -le "755" ]; then
        # If they are safe, try to obtain fingerprints from the key file
        # (to ensure there won't be e.g. CRC error).
        readarray -t GPG_OUT < <(gpg --show-keys --with-fingerprint --with-colons "${REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY}" | grep '^fpr' | cut -d ":" -f 10)
        GPG_RESULT=$?
        # No CRC error, safe to proceed
        if [ "${GPG_RESULT}" -eq "0" ]; then
            echo "${GPG_OUT[*]}" | grep -vE "${FEDORA_RELEASE_FINGERPRINT}" || {
            # If file doesn't contain any keys with unknown fingerprint, import it
            rpm --import "${REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY}"
            }
        fi
    fi
}

remediate_gpgkey_installed

Rule   Ensure gpgcheck Enabled In Main dnf Configuration   [ref]

The gpgcheck option controls whether RPM packages' signatures are always checked prior to installation. To configure dnf to check package signatures before installing them, ensure the following line appears in /etc/dnf/dnf.conf in the [main] section: 
gpgcheck=1
Rationale:
Changes to any software components can have significant effects on the overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor.
Accordingly, patches, service packs, device drivers, or operating system components must be signed with a certificate recognized and approved by the organization.
Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation validates the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from a vendor. This ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Self-signed certificates are disallowed by this requirement. Certificates used to verify the software must be from an approved Certificate Authority (CA).
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_ensure_gpgcheck_globally_activated
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R15), 11, 2, 3, 9, 5.10.4.1, APO01.06, BAI03.05, BAI06.01, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS06.02, 3.4.8, CCI-001749, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.312(b), 164.312(c)(1), 164.312(c)(2), 164.312(e)(2)(i), 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.3.4.4.4, SR 3.1, SR 3.3, SR 3.4, SR 3.8, SR 7.6, A.11.2.4, A.12.1.2, A.12.2.1, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, CM-5(3), SI-7, SC-12, SC-12(3), CM-6(a), SA-12, SA-12(10), CM-11(a), CM-11(b), PR.DS-6, PR.DS-8, PR.IP-1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2, Req-6.2, SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153, SRG-OS-000366-VMM-001430, SRG-OS-000370-VMM-001460, SRG-OS-000404-VMM-001650


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.8
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2
  - configure_strategy
  - ensure_gpgcheck_globally_activated
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure GPG check is globally activated
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dnf/dnf.conf
    section: main
    option: gpgcheck
    value: 1
    no_extra_spaces: true
    create: false
  when: '"yum" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.8
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2
  - configure_strategy
  - ensure_gpgcheck_globally_activated
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q yum; then

# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
sed_command=('sed' '-i')
if test -L "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"; then
    sed_command+=('--follow-symlinks')
fi

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^gpgcheck")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^gpgcheck\\>" "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    "${sed_command[@]}" "s/^gpgcheck\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"
else
    # \n is precaution for case where file ends without trailing newline
    
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Local Packages   [ref]

dnf should be configured to verify the signature(s) of local packages prior to installation. To configure dnf to verify signatures of local packages, set the localpkg_gpgcheck to 1 in /etc/dnf/dnf.conf.
Rationale:
Changes to any software components can have significant effects to the overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures the software has not been tampered and has been provided by a trusted vendor.

Accordingly, patches, service packs, device drivers, or operating system components must be signed with a certificate recognized and approved by the organization.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_ensure_gpgcheck_local_packages
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R15), 11, 3, 9, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, 3.4.8, CCI-001749, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.312(b), 164.312(c)(1), 164.312(c)(2), 164.312(e)(2)(i), 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, SR 7.6, A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, CM-11(a), CM-11(b), CM-6(a), CM-5(3), SA-12, SA-12(10), PR.IP-1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2, SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153, SRG-OS-000366-VMM-001430, SRG-OS-000370-VMM-001460, SRG-OS-000404-VMM-001650


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.8
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10)
  - ensure_gpgcheck_local_packages
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Ensure GPG check Enabled for Local Packages (dnf)
  block:

  - name: Check stats of dnf
    stat:
      path: /etc/dnf/dnf.conf
    register: pkg

  - name: Check if config file of dnf is a symlink
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pkg_config_file_symlink: '{{ pkg.stat.lnk_target if pkg.stat.lnk_target is match("^/.*")
        else "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf" | dirname ~ "/" ~ pkg.stat.lnk_target }}'
    when: pkg.stat.lnk_target is defined

  - name: Ensure GPG check Enabled for Local Packages (dnf)
    ini_file:
      dest: '{{ pkg_config_file_symlink |  default("/etc/dnf/dnf.conf") }}'
      section: main
      option: localpkg_gpgcheck
      value: 1
      no_extra_spaces: true
      create: true
  when: '"yum" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.8
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10)
  - ensure_gpgcheck_local_packages
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q yum; then

# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
sed_command=('sed' '-i')
if test -L "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"; then
    sed_command+=('--follow-symlinks')
fi

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^localpkg_gpgcheck")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^localpkg_gpgcheck\\>" "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    "${sed_command[@]}" "s/^localpkg_gpgcheck\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"
else
    # \n is precaution for case where file ends without trailing newline
    
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for All dnf Package Repositories   [ref]

To ensure signature checking is not disabled for any repos, remove any lines from files in /etc/yum.repos.d of the form: 
gpgcheck=0
Rationale:
Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation validates the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from a vendor. This ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Self-signed certificates are disallowed by this requirement. Certificates used to verify the software must be from an approved Certificate Authority (CA)."
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_ensure_gpgcheck_never_disabled
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R15), 11, 2, 3, 9, 5.10.4.1, APO01.06, BAI03.05, BAI06.01, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS06.02, 3.4.8, CCI-001749, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.312(b), 164.312(c)(1), 164.312(c)(2), 164.312(e)(2)(i), 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.3.4.4.4, SR 3.1, SR 3.3, SR 3.4, SR 3.8, SR 7.6, A.11.2.4, A.12.1.2, A.12.2.1, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, CM-5(3), SI-7, SC-12, SC-12(3), CM-6(a), SA-12, SA-12(10), CM-11(a), CM-11(b), PR.DS-6, PR.DS-8, PR.IP-1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2, Req-6.2, SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153, SRG-OS-000366-VMM-001430, SRG-OS-000370-VMM-001460, SRG-OS-000404-VMM-001650


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Strategy:enable
- name: Grep for dnf repo section names
  shell: |
    set -o pipefail
    grep -HEr '^\[.+\]' -r /etc/yum.repos.d/
  register: repo_grep_results
  ignore_errors: true
  changed_when: false
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.8
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2
  - enable_strategy
  - ensure_gpgcheck_never_disabled
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Set gpgcheck=1 for each dnf repo
  ini_file:
    path: '{{ item[0] }}'
    section: '{{ item[1] }}'
    option: gpgcheck
    value: '1'
    no_extra_spaces: true
  loop: '{{ repo_grep_results.stdout | regex_findall( ''(.+\.repo):\[(.+)\]\n?'' )
    }}'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.10.4.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.8
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12
  - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-7
  - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2
  - enable_strategy
  - ensure_gpgcheck_never_disabled
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed



sed -i 's/gpgcheck\s*=.*/gpgcheck=1/g' /etc/yum.repos.d/*

Rule   Enable dnf-automatic Timer   [ref]

The dnf-automatic timer can be enabled with the following command: 
$ sudo systemctl enable dnf-automatic.timer
Rationale:
The dnf-automatic is an alternative command line interface (CLI) to dnf upgrade with specific facilities to make it suitable to be executed automatically and regularly from systemd timers, cron jobs and similar. The tool is controlled by dnf-automatic.timer SystemD timer.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_timer_dnf-automatic_enabled
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R8), SI-2(5), CM-6(a), SI-2(c), FMT_SMF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable
- name: Enable timer dnf-automatic
  block:

  - name: Gather the package facts
    package_facts:
      manager: auto

  - name: Enable timer dnf-automatic
    systemd:
      name: dnf-automatic.timer
      enabled: 'yes'
      state: started
    when:
    - '"dnf-automatic" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-2(5)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-2(c)
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - timer_dnf-automatic_enabled

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable

SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'dnf-automatic.timer'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'dnf-automatic.timer'
Group   Account and Access Control   Group contains 12 groups and 19 rules
[ref]   In traditional Unix security, if an attacker gains shell access to a certain login account, they can perform any action or access any file to which that account has access. Therefore, making it more difficult for unauthorized people to gain shell access to accounts, particularly to privileged accounts, is a necessary part of securing a system. This section introduces mechanisms for restricting access to accounts under Fedora.
Group   Warning Banners for System Accesses   Group contains 1 group and 3 rules
[ref]   Each system should expose as little information about itself as possible.

System banners, which are typically displayed just before a login prompt, give out information about the service or the host's operating system. This might include the distribution name and the system kernel version, and the particular version of a network service. This information can assist intruders in gaining access to the system as it can reveal whether the system is running vulnerable software. Most network services can be configured to limit what information is displayed.

Many organizations implement security policies that require a system banner provide notice of the system's ownership, provide warning to unauthorized users, and remind authorized users of their consent to monitoring.
Group   Implement a GUI Warning Banner   Group contains 2 rules

Rule   Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner   [ref]

In the default graphical environment, displaying a login warning banner in the GNOME Display Manager's login screen can be enabled on the login screen by setting banner-message-enable to true.

To enable, add or edit banner-message-enable to /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/login-screen]
banner-message-enable=true
Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable
After the settings have been set, run dconf update. The banner text must also be set.
Rationale:
Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.

For U.S. Government systems, system use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.9, CCI-000048, CCI-000050, CCI-001384, CCI-001385, CCI-001386, CCI-001387, CCI-001388, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, AC-8(a), AC-8(b), AC-8(c), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006, SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/login-screen
    option: banner-message-enable
    value: 'true'
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME banner-message-enabled
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$
    line: /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable
    create: true
  when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|distro.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/distro.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/distro.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)banner-message-enable(\s*=)/#\1banner-message-enable\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi


[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")"
if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=\\s*.*/banner-message-enable=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\banner-message-enable=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi

dconf update
# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|distro.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$" /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable" >> "/etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Modify the System Login Banner   [ref]

To configure the system login banner edit /etc/issue. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer. The DoD required text is either:

You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions:
-The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations.
-At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS.
-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose.
-This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or privacy.
-Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details.

OR:

I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't.
Rationale:
Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.

System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_banner_etc_issue
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.9, CCI-000048, CCI-000050, CCI-001384, CCI-001385, CCI-001386, CCI-001387, CCI-001388, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, AC-8(a), AC-8(c), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006, SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088, SRG-OS-000023-VMM-000060, SRG-OS-000024-VMM-000070


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
- name: XCCDF Value login_banner_text # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    login_banner_text: !!str ^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$
  tags:
    - always

- name: Modify the System Login Banner - ensure correct banner
  copy:
    dest: /etc/issue
    content: '{{ login_banner_text | regex_replace("^\^(.*)\$$", "\1") | regex_replace("^\((.*\.)\|.*\)$",
      "\1") | regex_replace("\[\\s\\n\]\+"," ") | regex_replace("\(\?:\[\\n\]\+\|\(\?:\\\\n\)\+\)",
      "\n") | regex_replace("\\", "") | wordwrap() }}'
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - banner_etc_issue
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then

login_banner_text='^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$'


# Multiple regexes transform the banner regex into a usable banner
# 0 - Remove anchors around the banner text
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^\^\(.*\)\$$/\1/g')
# 1 - Keep only the first banners if there are multiple
#    (dod_banners contains the long and short banner)
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^(\(.*\.\)|.*)$/\1/g')
# 2 - Add spaces ' '. (Transforms regex for "space or newline" into a " ")
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\]+/ /g')
# 3 - Adds newlines. (Transforms "(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\n)+)" into "\n")
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\\\n)+)/\n/g')
# 4 - Remove any leftover backslash. (From any parethesis in the banner, for example).
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\\//g')
formatted=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | fold -sw 80)

cat <<EOF >/etc/issue
$formatted
EOF

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi
Group   Protect Accounts by Configuring PAM   Group contains 3 groups and 10 rules
[ref]   PAM, or Pluggable Authentication Modules, is a system which implements modular authentication for Linux programs. PAM provides a flexible and configurable architecture for authentication, and it should be configured to minimize exposure to unnecessary risk. This section contains guidance on how to accomplish that.

PAM is implemented as a set of shared objects which are loaded and invoked whenever an application wishes to authenticate a user. Typically, the application must be running as root in order to take advantage of PAM, because PAM's modules often need to be able to access sensitive stores of account information, such as /etc/shadow. Traditional privileged network listeners (e.g. sshd) or SUID programs (e.g. sudo) already meet this requirement. An SUID root application, userhelper, is provided so that programs which are not SUID or privileged themselves can still take advantage of PAM.

PAM looks in the directory /etc/pam.d for application-specific configuration information. For instance, if the program login attempts to authenticate a user, then PAM's libraries follow the instructions in the file /etc/pam.d/login to determine what actions should be taken.

One very important file in /etc/pam.d is /etc/pam.d/system-auth. This file, which is included by many other PAM configuration files, defines 'default' system authentication measures. Modifying this file is a good way to make far-reaching authentication changes, for instance when implementing a centralized authentication service.
Warning:  Be careful when making changes to PAM's configuration files. The syntax for these files is complex, and modifications can have unexpected consequences. The default configurations shipped with applications should be sufficient for most users.
Warning:  Running authconfig or system-config-authentication will re-write the PAM configuration files, destroying any manually made changes and replacing them with a series of system defaults. One reference to the configuration file syntax can be found at https://fossies.org/linux/Linux-PAM-docs/doc/sag/Linux-PAM_SAG.pdf.
Group   Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts   Group contains 4 rules
[ref]   The pam_faillock PAM module provides the capability to lock out user accounts after a number of failed login attempts. Its documentation is available in /usr/share/doc/pam-VERSION/txts/README.pam_faillock.

Warning:  Locking out user accounts presents the risk of a denial-of-service attack. The lockout policy must weigh whether the risk of such a denial-of-service attack outweighs the benefits of thwarting password guessing attacks.

Rule   Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts   [ref]

This rule configures the system to lock out accounts after a number of incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so. pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully defined to work as expected. In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, depending on the OS version.
Warning:  If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file.
Rationale:
By limiting the number of failed logon attempts, the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, also known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R18), 1, 12, 15, 16, 5.5.3, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.8, CCI-000044, CCI-002236, CCI-002237, CCI-002238, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), AC-7(a), PR.AC-7, FIA_AFL.1, Req-8.1.6, SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128, SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005, SRG-OS-000021-VMM-000050


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect
    tool
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /usr/bin/authselect
  register: result_authselect_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect
    tool is present
  block:

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect
      current profile
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect check
    register: result_authselect_check_cmd
    changed_when: false
    ignore_errors: true

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based
      on the authselect integrity check result
    ansible.builtin.assert:
      that:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      fail_msg:
      - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
      - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not
        selected or the selected profile is not intact.
      - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
        is available.
      - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand,
        a custom authselect profile is recommended.
      success_msg:
      - authselect integrity check passed

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features
    ansible.builtin.shell:
      cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
    register: result_authselect_features
    changed_when: false
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" feature
      is enabled using authselect tool
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock
    register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
    - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock")

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
      are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect
    tool is not present
  block:

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so
      is already enabled
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail)
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth
      editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth
      insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail
      editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: auth        required      pam_faillock.so authfail
      insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so account
      section editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: account     required      pam_faillock.so
      insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny: !!str 3
  tags:
    - always

- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf
    file
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/security/faillock.conf
  register: result_faillock_conf_check
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    deny parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/security/faillock.conf
    regexp: ^\s*deny\s*=
    line: deny = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }}
    state: present
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    deny parameter not in PAM files
  block:

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      file is present
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    register: result_pam_file_present

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation
      for the system
    block:

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to
        be edited as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies
        on authselect tool
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /usr/bin/authselect
      register: result_authselect_present

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom
        profile is used if authselect is present
      block:

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect
          current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect check
        register: result_authselect_check_cmd
        changed_when: false
        ignore_errors: true

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based
          on the authselect integrity check result
        ansible.builtin.assert:
          that:
          - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
          fail_msg:
          - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
          - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
            not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
          - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
            is available.
          - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
            demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
          success_msg:
          - authselect integrity check passed

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current
          profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
        register: result_authselect_profile
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect
          profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect
          custom profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current
          features to also enable them in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
        register: result_authselect_features
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile
          with the same name was already created
        ansible.builtin.stat:
          path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect
          custom profile based on the current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
            }}
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
          are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect
          custom profile is selected
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect
          features in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
        loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
        register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_features is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
          are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to
          be edited according to the custom authselect profile
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
            | basename }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "deny" option
        from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdeny\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
        replace: \1\2
      register: result_pam_option_removal

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
        are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - result_pam_option_removal is changed
    when:
    - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth
      file is present
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    register: result_pam_file_present

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation
      for the system
    block:

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to
        be edited as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies
        on authselect tool
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /usr/bin/authselect
      register: result_authselect_present

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom
        profile is used if authselect is present
      block:

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect
          current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect check
        register: result_authselect_check_cmd
        changed_when: false
        ignore_errors: true

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based
          on the authselect integrity check result
        ansible.builtin.assert:
          that:
          - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
          fail_msg:
          - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
          - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
            not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
          - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
            is available.
          - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
            demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
          success_msg:
          - authselect integrity check passed

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current
          profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
        register: result_authselect_profile
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect
          profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect
          custom profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current
          features to also enable them in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
        register: result_authselect_features
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile
          with the same name was already created
        ansible.builtin.stat:
          path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect
          custom profile based on the current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
            }}
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
          are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect
          custom profile is selected
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect
          features in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
        loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
        register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_features is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
          are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

      - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to
          be edited according to the custom authselect profile
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
            | basename }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "deny" option
        from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdeny\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
        replace: \1\2
      register: result_pam_option_removal

    - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
        are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - result_pam_option_removal is changed
    when:
    - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    deny parameter in PAM files
  block:

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so
      deny parameter is already enabled in pam files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*deny
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so
      preauth deny parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)
      line: \1required\3 deny={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }}
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found == 0

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so
      authfail deny parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)
      line: \1required\3 deny={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }}
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found == 0

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value
      for pam_faillock.so preauth deny parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(deny)=[0-9]+(.*)
      line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }}\5
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found > 0

  - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value
      for pam_faillock.so authfail deny parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(deny)=[0-9]+(.*)
      line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }}\5
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found > 0
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny='3'


if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
    if ! authselect check; then
echo "
authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
exit 1
fi
authselect enable-feature with-faillock

authselect apply-changes -b
else
    
AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")
for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
    if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file"
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file"
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account     required      pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file"
    fi
    sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required     \3/g' "$pam_file"
done

fi

AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")

FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf"
if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then
    regex="^\s*deny\s*="
    line="deny = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"
    if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then
        echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF
    else
        sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(deny\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF
    fi
    for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
    do
        if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then
            PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file"
            if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
                
                if ! authselect check; then
                echo "
                authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
                This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
                It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
                In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
                exit 1
                fi

                CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
                # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
                if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
                    ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
                    authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
                    CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
                    
                    authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
                    authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
                    for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                        authselect enable-feature $feature;
                    done
                    
                    authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
                fi
                PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file")
                PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

                authselect apply-changes -b
            fi
            
        if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bdeny\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdeny\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
        fi
            if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
                
                authselect apply-changes -b
            fi
        else
            echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2
        fi
    done
else
    for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
    do
        if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*deny' "$pam_file"; then
            sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ deny='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'/' "$pam_file"
            sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ deny='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'/' "$pam_file"
        else
            sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"deny"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'\3/' "$pam_file"
            sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"deny"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'\3/' "$pam_file"
        fi
    done
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts   [ref]

This rule configures the system to lock out the root account after a number of incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so. pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully defined to work as expected. In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, depending on the OS version.
Warning:  If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file.
Rationale:
By limiting the number of failed logon attempts, the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, also known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R18), 1, 12, 15, 16, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, CCI-002238, CCI-000044, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), AC-7(b), IA-5(c), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128, SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system
    relies on authselect tool
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /usr/bin/authselect
  register: result_authselect_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where
    authselect tool is present
  block:

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity
      of authselect current profile
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect check
    register: result_authselect_check_cmd
    changed_when: false
    ignore_errors: true

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message
      based on the authselect integrity check result
    ansible.builtin.assert:
      that:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      fail_msg:
      - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
      - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not
        selected or the selected profile is not intact.
      - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
        is available.
      - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand,
        a custom authselect profile is recommended.
      success_msg:
      - authselect integrity check passed

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect
      current features
    ansible.builtin.shell:
      cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
    register: result_authselect_features
    changed_when: false
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock"
      feature is enabled using authselect tool
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock
    register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
    - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock")

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
      changes are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where
    authselect tool is not present
  block:

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so
      is already enabled
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail)
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so
      preauth editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth
      insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so
      authfail editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: auth        required      pam_faillock.so authfail
      insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so
      account section editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: account     required      pam_faillock.so
      insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence
    of /etc/security/faillock.conf file
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/security/faillock.conf
  register: result_faillock_conf_check
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    even_deny_root parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/security/faillock.conf
    regexp: ^\s*even_deny_root
    line: even_deny_root
    state: present
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    even_deny_root parameter not in PAM files
  block:

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      file is present
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    register: result_pam_file_present

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper
      remediation for the system
    block:

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM
        file to be edited as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system
        relies on authselect tool
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /usr/bin/authselect
      register: result_authselect_present

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
        custom profile is used if authselect is present
      block:

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity
          of authselect current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect check
        register: result_authselect_check_cmd
        changed_when: false
        ignore_errors: true

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Informative
          message based on the authselect integrity check result
        ansible.builtin.assert:
          that:
          - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
          fail_msg:
          - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
          - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
            not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
          - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
            is available.
          - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
            demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
          success_msg:
          - authselect integrity check passed

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect
          current profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
        register: result_authselect_profile
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the
          current authselect profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the
          new authselect custom profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect
          current features to also enable them in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
        register: result_authselect_features
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any
          custom profile with the same name was already created
        ansible.builtin.stat:
          path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Create an
          authselect custom profile based on the current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
            }}
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
          changes are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the
          authselect custom profile is selected
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the
          authselect features in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
        loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
        register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_features is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
          changes are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Change the
          PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
            | basename }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "even_deny_root"
        option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\beven_deny_root\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
        replace: \1\2
      register: result_pam_option_removal

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
        changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - result_pam_option_removal is changed
    when:
    - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth
      file is present
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    register: result_pam_file_present

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper
      remediation for the system
    block:

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM
        file to be edited as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system
        relies on authselect tool
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /usr/bin/authselect
      register: result_authselect_present

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
        custom profile is used if authselect is present
      block:

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity
          of authselect current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect check
        register: result_authselect_check_cmd
        changed_when: false
        ignore_errors: true

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Informative
          message based on the authselect integrity check result
        ansible.builtin.assert:
          that:
          - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
          fail_msg:
          - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
          - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
            not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
          - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
            is available.
          - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
            demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
          success_msg:
          - authselect integrity check passed

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect
          current profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
        register: result_authselect_profile
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the
          current authselect profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the
          new authselect custom profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect
          current features to also enable them in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
        register: result_authselect_features
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any
          custom profile with the same name was already created
        ansible.builtin.stat:
          path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Create an
          authselect custom profile based on the current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
            }}
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
          changes are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the
          authselect custom profile is selected
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the
          authselect features in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
        loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
        register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_features is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
          changes are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

      - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Change the
          PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
            | basename }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "even_deny_root"
        option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\beven_deny_root\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
        replace: \1\2
      register: result_pam_option_removal

    - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
        changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - result_pam_option_removal is changed
    when:
    - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    even_deny_root parameter in PAM files
  block:

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so
      even_deny_root parameter is already enabled in pam files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*even_deny_root
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_faillock_even_deny_root_parameter_is_present

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion
      of pam_faillock.so preauth even_deny_root parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)
      line: \1required\3 even_deny_root
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_even_deny_root_parameter_is_present.found == 0

  - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion
      of pam_faillock.so authfail even_deny_root parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)
      line: \1required\3 even_deny_root
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_even_deny_root_parameter_is_present.found == 0
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
    if ! authselect check; then
echo "
authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
exit 1
fi
authselect enable-feature with-faillock

authselect apply-changes -b
else
    
AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")
for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
    if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file"
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file"
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account     required      pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file"
    fi
    sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required     \3/g' "$pam_file"
done

fi

AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")

FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf"
if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then
    regex="^\s*even_deny_root"
    line="even_deny_root"
    if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then
        echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF
    fi
    for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
    do
        if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then
            PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file"
            if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
                
                if ! authselect check; then
                echo "
                authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
                This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
                It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
                In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
                exit 1
                fi

                CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
                # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
                if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
                    ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
                    authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
                    CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
                    
                    authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
                    authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
                    for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                        authselect enable-feature $feature;
                    done
                    
                    authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
                fi
                PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file")
                PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

                authselect apply-changes -b
            fi
            
        if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\beven_deny_root\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\beven_deny_root\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
        fi
            if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
                
                authselect apply-changes -b
            fi
        else
            echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2
        fi
    done
else
    for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
    do
        if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*even_deny_root' "$pam_file"; then
            sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ even_deny_root/' "$pam_file"
            sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ even_deny_root/' "$pam_file"
        fi
    done
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts   [ref]

Utilizing pam_faillock.so, the fail_interval directive configures the system to lock out an account after a number of incorrect login attempts within a specified time period.
Warning:  If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file.
Rationale:
By limiting the number of failed logon attempts the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, otherwise known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R18), 1, 12, 15, 16, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, CCI-000044, CCI-002236, CCI-002237, CCI-002238, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), AC-7(a), PR.AC-7, FIA_AFL.1, SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128, SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005, SRG-OS-000021-VMM-000050


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies
    on authselect tool
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /usr/bin/authselect
  register: result_authselect_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect
    tool is present
  block:

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of
      authselect current profile
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect check
    register: result_authselect_check_cmd
    changed_when: false
    ignore_errors: true

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Informative message
      based on the authselect integrity check result
    ansible.builtin.assert:
      that:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      fail_msg:
      - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
      - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not
        selected or the selected profile is not intact.
      - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
        is available.
      - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand,
        a custom authselect profile is recommended.
      success_msg:
      - authselect integrity check passed

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current
      features
    ansible.builtin.shell:
      cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
    register: result_authselect_features
    changed_when: false
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock"
      feature is enabled using authselect tool
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock
    register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
    - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock")

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
      are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect
    tool is not present
  block:

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so
      is already enabled
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail)
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so
      preauth editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth
      insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so
      authfail editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: auth        required      pam_faillock.so authfail
      insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so
      account section editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: account     required      pam_faillock.so
      insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval: !!str 900
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of
    /etc/security/faillock.conf file
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/security/faillock.conf
  register: result_faillock_conf_check
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    fail_interval parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/security/faillock.conf
    regexp: ^\s*fail_interval\s*=
    line: fail_interval = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }}
    state: present
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    fail_interval parameter not in PAM files
  block:

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      file is present
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    register: result_pam_file_present

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation
      for the system
    block:

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file
        to be edited as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies
        on authselect tool
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /usr/bin/authselect
      register: result_authselect_present

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
        custom profile is used if authselect is present
      block:

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity
          of authselect current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect check
        register: result_authselect_check_cmd
        changed_when: false
        ignore_errors: true

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Informative message
          based on the authselect integrity check result
        ansible.builtin.assert:
          that:
          - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
          fail_msg:
          - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
          - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
            not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
          - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
            is available.
          - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
            demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
          success_msg:
          - authselect integrity check passed

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect
          current profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
        register: result_authselect_profile
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the current
          authselect profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the new
          authselect custom profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect
          current features to also enable them in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
        register: result_authselect_features
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom
          profile with the same name was already created
        ansible.builtin.stat:
          path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect
          custom profile based on the current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
            }}
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
          changes are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect
          custom profile is selected
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect
          features in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
        loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
        register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_features is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
          changes are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM
          file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
            | basename }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "fail_interval"
        option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bfail_interval\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
        replace: \1\2
      register: result_pam_option_removal

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
        changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - result_pam_option_removal is changed
    when:
    - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth
      file is present
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    register: result_pam_file_present

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation
      for the system
    block:

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file
        to be edited as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies
        on authselect tool
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /usr/bin/authselect
      register: result_authselect_present

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
        custom profile is used if authselect is present
      block:

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity
          of authselect current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect check
        register: result_authselect_check_cmd
        changed_when: false
        ignore_errors: true

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Informative message
          based on the authselect integrity check result
        ansible.builtin.assert:
          that:
          - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
          fail_msg:
          - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
          - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
            not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
          - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
            is available.
          - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
            demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
          success_msg:
          - authselect integrity check passed

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect
          current profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
        register: result_authselect_profile
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the current
          authselect profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the new
          authselect custom profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect
          current features to also enable them in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
        register: result_authselect_features
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom
          profile with the same name was already created
        ansible.builtin.stat:
          path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect
          custom profile based on the current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
            }}
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
          changes are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect
          custom profile is selected
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect
          features in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
        loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
        register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_features is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
          changes are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

      - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM
          file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
            | basename }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "fail_interval"
        option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bfail_interval\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
        replace: \1\2
      register: result_pam_option_removal

    - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect
        changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - result_pam_option_removal is changed
    when:
    - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    fail_interval parameter in PAM files
  block:

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so
      fail_interval parameter is already enabled in pam files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*fail_interval
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion
      of pam_faillock.so preauth fail_interval parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)
      line: \1required\3 fail_interval={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval
        }}
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found == 0

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion
      of pam_faillock.so authfail fail_interval parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)
      line: \1required\3 fail_interval={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval
        }}
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found == 0

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired
      value for pam_faillock.so preauth fail_interval parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(fail_interval)=[0-9]+(.*)
      line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }}\5
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found > 0

  - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired
      value for pam_faillock.so authfail fail_interval parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(fail_interval)=[0-9]+(.*)
      line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }}\5
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found > 0
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval='900'


if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
    if ! authselect check; then
echo "
authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
exit 1
fi
authselect enable-feature with-faillock

authselect apply-changes -b
else
    
AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")
for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
    if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file"
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file"
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account     required      pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file"
    fi
    sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required     \3/g' "$pam_file"
done

fi

AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")

FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf"
if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then
    regex="^\s*fail_interval\s*="
    line="fail_interval = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"
    if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then
        echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF
    else
        sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(fail_interval\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF
    fi
    for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
    do
        if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then
            PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file"
            if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
                
                if ! authselect check; then
                echo "
                authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
                This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
                It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
                In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
                exit 1
                fi

                CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
                # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
                if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
                    ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
                    authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
                    CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
                    
                    authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
                    authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
                    for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                        authselect enable-feature $feature;
                    done
                    
                    authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
                fi
                PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file")
                PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

                authselect apply-changes -b
            fi
            
        if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bfail_interval\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bfail_interval\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
        fi
            if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
                
                authselect apply-changes -b
            fi
        else
            echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2
        fi
    done
else
    for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
    do
        if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*fail_interval' "$pam_file"; then
            sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ fail_interval='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'/' "$pam_file"
            sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ fail_interval='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'/' "$pam_file"
        else
            sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"fail_interval"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'\3/' "$pam_file"
            sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"fail_interval"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'\3/' "$pam_file"
        fi
    done
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts   [ref]

This rule configures the system to lock out accounts during a specified time period after a number of incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so. pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully defined to work as expected. In order to avoid any errors when manually editing these files, it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, depending on the OS version. If unlock_time is set to 0, manual intervention by an administrator is required to unlock a user. This should be done using the faillock tool.
Warning:  If the system supports the new /etc/security/faillock.conf file but the pam_faillock.so parameters are defined directly in /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth, the remediation will migrate the unlock_time parameter to /etc/security/faillock.conf to ensure compatibility with authselect tool. The parameters deny and fail_interval, if used, also have to be migrated by their respective remediation.
Warning:  If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file.
Rationale:
By limiting the number of failed logon attempts the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, otherwise known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R18), 1, 12, 15, 16, 5.5.3, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.8, CCI-000044, CCI-002236, CCI-002237, CCI-002238, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), AC-7(b), PR.AC-7, FIA_AFL.1, Req-8.1.7, SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128, SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005, SRG-OS-000329-VMM-001180


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on
    authselect tool
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /usr/bin/authselect
  register: result_authselect_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect
    tool is present
  block:

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect
      current profile
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect check
    register: result_authselect_check_cmd
    changed_when: false
    ignore_errors: true

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based
      on the authselect integrity check result
    ansible.builtin.assert:
      that:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      fail_msg:
      - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
      - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not
        selected or the selected profile is not intact.
      - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
        is available.
      - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand,
        a custom authselect profile is recommended.
      success_msg:
      - authselect integrity check passed

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features
    ansible.builtin.shell:
      cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
    register: result_authselect_features
    changed_when: false
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" feature
      is enabled using authselect tool
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock
    register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
    - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock")

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
      are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect
    tool is not present
  block:

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so
      is already enabled
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail)
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth
      editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth
      insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail
      editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: auth        required      pam_faillock.so authfail
      insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so account
      section editing PAM files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      line: account     required      pam_faillock.so
      insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf
    file
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/security/faillock.conf
  register: result_faillock_conf_check
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    unlock_time parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/security/faillock.conf
    regexp: ^\s*unlock_time\s*=
    line: unlock_time = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }}
    state: present
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    unlock_time parameter not in PAM files
  block:

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      file is present
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    register: result_pam_file_present

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation
      for the system
    block:

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to
        be edited as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies
        on authselect tool
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /usr/bin/authselect
      register: result_authselect_present

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom
        profile is used if authselect is present
      block:

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect
          current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect check
        register: result_authselect_check_cmd
        changed_when: false
        ignore_errors: true

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message
          based on the authselect integrity check result
        ansible.builtin.assert:
          that:
          - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
          fail_msg:
          - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
          - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
            not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
          - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
            is available.
          - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
            demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
          success_msg:
          - authselect integrity check passed

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current
          profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
        register: result_authselect_profile
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect
          profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect
          custom profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current
          features to also enable them in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
        register: result_authselect_features
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom
          profile with the same name was already created
        ansible.builtin.stat:
          path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect
          custom profile based on the current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
            }}
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
          are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect
          custom profile is selected
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect
          features in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
        loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
        register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_features is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
          are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file
          to be edited according to the custom authselect profile
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
            | basename }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "unlock_time"
        option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bunlock_time\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
        replace: \1\2
      register: result_pam_option_removal

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
        are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - result_pam_option_removal is changed
    when:
    - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth
      file is present
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    register: result_pam_file_present

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation
      for the system
    block:

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to
        be edited as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies
        on authselect tool
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /usr/bin/authselect
      register: result_authselect_present

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom
        profile is used if authselect is present
      block:

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect
          current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect check
        register: result_authselect_check_cmd
        changed_when: false
        ignore_errors: true

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message
          based on the authselect integrity check result
        ansible.builtin.assert:
          that:
          - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
          fail_msg:
          - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
          - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
            not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
          - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
            is available.
          - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
            demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
          success_msg:
          - authselect integrity check passed

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current
          profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
        register: result_authselect_profile
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect
          profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect
          custom profile as a local fact
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
          authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current
          features to also enable them in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.shell:
          cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
        register: result_authselect_features
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom
          profile with the same name was already created
        ansible.builtin.stat:
          path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
        changed_when: false
        when:
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect
          custom profile based on the current profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
            }}
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
          are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect
          custom profile is selected
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
        register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
        - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect
          features in the custom profile
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
        loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
        register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
        when:
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_authselect_features is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
          are applied
        ansible.builtin.command:
          cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        when:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
        - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
        - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

      - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file
          to be edited according to the custom authselect profile
        ansible.builtin.set_fact:
          pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
            | basename }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "unlock_time"
        option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bunlock_time\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
        replace: \1\2
      register: result_pam_option_removal

    - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes
        are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - result_pam_option_removal is changed
    when:
    - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so
    unlock_time parameter in PAM files
  block:

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so
      unlock_time parameter is already enabled in pam files
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*unlock_time
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of
      pam_faillock.so preauth unlock_time parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)
      line: \1required\3 unlock_time={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
        }}
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found == 0

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of
      pam_faillock.so authfail unlock_time parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)
      line: \1required\3 unlock_time={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
        }}
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found == 0

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value
      for pam_faillock.so preauth unlock_time parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(unlock_time)=[0-9]+(.*)
      line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }}\5
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found > 0

  - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value
      for pam_faillock.so authfail unlock_time parameter in auth section
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(unlock_time)=[0-9]+(.*)
      line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }}\5
      state: present
    loop:
    - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    when:
    - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found > 0
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7
  - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time='0'


if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
    if ! authselect check; then
echo "
authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
exit 1
fi
authselect enable-feature with-faillock

authselect apply-changes -b
else
    
AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")
for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
    if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file"
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file"
        sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account     required      pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file"
    fi
    sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required     \3/g' "$pam_file"
done

fi

AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")

FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf"
if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then
    regex="^\s*unlock_time\s*="
    line="unlock_time = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"
    if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then
        echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF
    else
        sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(unlock_time\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF
    fi
    for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
    do
        if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then
            PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file"
            if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
                
                if ! authselect check; then
                echo "
                authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
                This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
                It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
                In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
                exit 1
                fi

                CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
                # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
                if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
                    ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
                    authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
                    CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
                    
                    authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
                    authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
                    for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                        authselect enable-feature $feature;
                    done
                    
                    authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
                fi
                PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file")
                PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

                authselect apply-changes -b
            fi
            
        if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bunlock_time\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bunlock_time\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
        fi
            if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
                
                authselect apply-changes -b
            fi
        else
            echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2
        fi
    done
else
    for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
    do
        if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*unlock_time' "$pam_file"; then
            sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ unlock_time='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'/' "$pam_file"
            sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ unlock_time='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'/' "$pam_file"
        else
            sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"unlock_time"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'\3/' "$pam_file"
            sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"unlock_time"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'\3/' "$pam_file"
        fi
    done
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi
Group   Set Password Quality Requirements   Group contains 1 group and 6 rules
[ref]   The default pam_pwquality PAM module provides strength checking for passwords. It performs a number of checks, such as making sure passwords are not similar to dictionary words, are of at least a certain length, are not the previous password reversed, and are not simply a change of case from the previous password. It can also require passwords to be in certain character classes. The pam_pwquality module is the preferred way of configuring password requirements.

The man pages pam_pwquality(8) provide information on the capabilities and configuration of each.
Group   Set Password Quality Requirements with pam_pwquality   Group contains 6 rules
[ref]   The pam_pwquality PAM module can be configured to meet requirements for a variety of policies.

For example, to configure pam_pwquality to require at least one uppercase character, lowercase character, digit, and other (special) character, make sure that pam_pwquality exists in /etc/pam.d/system-auth: 
password    requisite     pam_pwquality.so try_first_pass local_users_only retry=3 authtok_type=
If no such line exists, add one as the first line of the password section in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. Next, modify the settings in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to match the following: 
difok = 4
minlen = 14
dcredit = -1
ucredit = -1
lcredit = -1
ocredit = -1
maxrepeat = 3
The arguments can be modified to ensure compliance with your organization's security policy. Discussion of each parameter follows.

Rule   Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters   [ref]

The pam_pwquality module's dcredit parameter controls requirements for usage of digits in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to contain that many digits. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional length credit for each digit. Modify the dcredit setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of a digit in passwords.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.

Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Requiring digits makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger search space.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_pam_dcredit
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R18), 1, 12, 15, 16, 5, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10, CCI-000194, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, IA-5(c), IA-5(1)(a), CM-6(a), IA-5(4), PR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, FMT_SMF_EXT.1, Req-8.2.3, SRG-OS-000071-GPOS-00039, SRG-OS-000071-VMM-000380


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - accounts_password_pam_dcredit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_dcredit # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_pam_dcredit: !!str -1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Ensure
    PAM variable dcredit is set accordingly
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf
    regexp: ^#?\s*dcredit
    line: dcredit = {{ var_password_pam_dcredit }}
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - accounts_password_pam_dcredit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_pam_dcredit='-1'






# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
sed_command=('sed' '-i')
if test -L "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    sed_command+=('--follow-symlinks')
fi

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^dcredit")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_dcredit"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^dcredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    "${sed_command[@]}" "s/^dcredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
else
    # \n is precaution for case where file ends without trailing newline
    
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters   [ref]

The pam_pwquality module's lcredit parameter controls requirements for usage of lowercase letters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to contain that many lowercase characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional length credit for each lowercase character. Modify the lcredit setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of a lowercase character in passwords.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.
Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possble combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Requiring a minimum number of lowercase characters makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger search space.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_pam_lcredit
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R18), 1, 12, 15, 16, 5, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10, CCI-000193, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, IA-5(c), IA-5(1)(a), CM-6(a), IA-5(4), PR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, FMT_SMF_EXT.1, Req-8.2.3, SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038, SRG-OS-000070-VMM-000370


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - accounts_password_pam_lcredit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_lcredit # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_pam_lcredit: !!str -1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters -
    Ensure PAM variable lcredit is set accordingly
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf
    regexp: ^#?\s*lcredit
    line: lcredit = {{ var_password_pam_lcredit }}
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - accounts_password_pam_lcredit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_pam_lcredit='-1'






# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
sed_command=('sed' '-i')
if test -L "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    sed_command+=('--follow-symlinks')
fi

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^lcredit")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_lcredit"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^lcredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    "${sed_command[@]}" "s/^lcredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
else
    # \n is precaution for case where file ends without trailing newline
    
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length   [ref]

The pam_pwquality module's minlen parameter controls requirements for minimum characters required in a password. Add minlen=12 after pam_pwquality to set minimum password length requirements.
Rationale:
The shorter the password, the lower the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password length is one factor of several that helps to determine strength and how long it takes to crack a password. Use of more characters in a password helps to exponentially increase the time and/or resources required to compromise the password.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_pam_minlen
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R18), 1, 12, 15, 16, 5, 5.6.2.1.1, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10, CCI-000205, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, IA-5(c), IA-5(1)(a), CM-6(a), IA-5(4), PR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, FMT_SMF_EXT.1, Req-8.2.3, SRG-OS-000078-GPOS-00046, SRG-OS-000072-VMM-000390, SRG-OS-000078-VMM-000450


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - accounts_password_pam_minlen
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_minlen # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_pam_minlen: !!str 12
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure PAM variable
    minlen is set accordingly
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf
    regexp: ^#?\s*minlen
    line: minlen = {{ var_password_pam_minlen }}
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - accounts_password_pam_minlen
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_pam_minlen='12'






# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
sed_command=('sed' '-i')
if test -L "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    sed_command+=('--follow-symlinks')
fi

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^minlen")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_minlen"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^minlen\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    "${sed_command[@]}" "s/^minlen\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
else
    # \n is precaution for case where file ends without trailing newline
    
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters   [ref]

The pam_pwquality module's ocredit= parameter controls requirements for usage of special (or "other") characters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to contain that many special characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional length credit for each special character. Modify the ocredit setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to equal -1 to require use of a special character in passwords.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.

Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Requiring a minimum number of special characters makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger search space.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_pam_ocredit
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R18), 1, 12, 15, 16, 5, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10, CCI-001619, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, IA-5(c), IA-5(1)(a), CM-6(a), IA-5(4), PR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, FMT_SMF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000266-GPOS-00101, SRG-OS-000266-VMM-000940


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_password_pam_ocredit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_ocredit # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_pam_ocredit: !!str -1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - Ensure
    PAM variable ocredit is set accordingly
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf
    regexp: ^#?\s*ocredit
    line: ocredit = {{ var_password_pam_ocredit }}
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_password_pam_ocredit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_pam_ocredit='-1'






# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
sed_command=('sed' '-i')
if test -L "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    sed_command+=('--follow-symlinks')
fi

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^ocredit")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_ocredit"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^ocredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    "${sed_command[@]}" "s/^ocredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
else
    # \n is precaution for case where file ends without trailing newline
    
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session   [ref]

To configure the number of retry prompts that are permitted per-session: Edit the pam_pwquality.so statement in /etc/pam.d/system-auth to show retry=3, or a lower value if site policy is more restrictive. The DoD requirement is a maximum of 3 prompts per session.
Rationale:
Setting the password retry prompts that are permitted on a per-session basis to a low value requires some software, such as SSH, to re-connect. This can slow down and draw additional attention to some types of password-guessing attacks. Note that this is different from account lockout, which is provided by the pam_faillock module.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_pam_retry
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 11, 12, 15, 16, 3, 5, 9, 5.5.3, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10, CCI-000192, CCI-000366, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 7.6, A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), AC-7(a), IA-5(4), PR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.IP-1, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227


Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_retry # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_pam_retry: !!str 3
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted
    Per-Session - Check if expected PAM module line is present in /etc/pam.d/system-auth
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.*
    state: absent
  check_mode: true
  changed_when: false
  register: result_pam_line_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted
    Per-Session - Include or update the PAM module line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth
  block:

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Check if required PAM module line is present in /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      with different control
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_line_other_control_present

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM module
      line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    ansible.builtin.replace:
      dest: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*)
      replace: \1requisite \2
    register: result_pam_module_edit
    when:
    - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the required PAM module line is included in /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      dest: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
      insertafter: ^\s*account
      line: password    requisite    pam_pwquality.so
    register: result_pam_module_add
    when:
    - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found
      > 1

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when: |
      result_authselect_present is defined and result_authselect_present.stat.exists and ((result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed))
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_pam_line_present.found is defined
  - result_pam_line_present.found == 0
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted
    Per-Session - Check if the required PAM module option is present in /etc/pam.d/system-auth
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.*\sretry\b
    state: absent
  check_mode: true
  changed_when: false
  register: result_pam_module_retry_option_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted
    Per-Session - Ensure the "retry" PAM option for "pam_pwquality.so" is included
    in /etc/pam.d/system-auth
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    backrefs: true
    regexp: ^(\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwquality.so.*)
    line: \1 retry={{ var_password_pam_retry }}
    state: present
  register: result_pam_retry_add
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_pam_module_retry_option_present.found == 0
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted
    Per-Session - Ensure the required value for "retry" PAM option from "pam_pwquality.so"
    in /etc/pam.d/system-auth
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    backrefs: true
    regexp: ^(\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwquality.so\s+.*)(retry)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*)
    line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_retry }} \3
  register: result_pam_retry_edit
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_pam_module_retry_option_present.found > 0
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_pam_retry='3'



	
		if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then
    PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        if ! authselect check; then
        echo "
        authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
        In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
        exit 1
        fi

        CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
        # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
        if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
            ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
            authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
            CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
            authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
            for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                authselect enable-feature $feature;
            done
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        fi
        PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth")
        PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
    if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module.
            if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then
                # The control is updated only if one single line matches.
                sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
            else
                LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^\s*account" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1)
                if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then
                    sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password     '"requisite"'    pam_pwquality.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
                else
                    echo 'password    '"requisite"'    pam_pwquality.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
                fi
            fi
        fi
        # Check the option
        if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.*\sretry\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwquality.so.*/ s/$/ retry='"$var_password_pam_retry"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
        else
            sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s+.*)('"retry"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_retry"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
        fi
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
else
    echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters   [ref]

The pam_pwquality module's ucredit= parameter controls requirements for usage of uppercase letters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to contain that many uppercase characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional length credit for each uppercase character. Modify the ucredit setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of an uppercase character in passwords.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.

Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_pam_ucredit
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R18), 1, 12, 15, 16, 5, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10, CCI-000192, CCI-000193, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, IA-5(c), IA-5(1)(a), CM-6(a), IA-5(4), PR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, FMT_SMF_EXT.1, Req-8.2.3, SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037, SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038, SRG-OS-000069-VMM-000360


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - accounts_password_pam_ucredit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_ucredit # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_pam_ucredit: !!str -1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters -
    Ensure PAM variable ucredit is set accordingly
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf
    regexp: ^#?\s*ucredit
    line: ucredit = {{ var_password_pam_ucredit }}
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - accounts_password_pam_ucredit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_pam_ucredit='-1'






# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
sed_command=('sed' '-i')
if test -L "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    sed_command+=('--follow-symlinks')
fi

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^ucredit")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_ucredit"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^ucredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    "${sed_command[@]}" "s/^ucredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
else
    # \n is precaution for case where file ends without trailing newline
    
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi
Group   Protect Physical Console Access   Group contains 2 groups and 4 rules
[ref]   It is impossible to fully protect a system from an attacker with physical access, so securing the space in which the system is located should be considered a necessary step. However, there are some steps which, if taken, make it more difficult for an attacker to quickly or undetectably modify a system from its console.
Group   Configure Screen Locking   Group contains 1 group and 1 rule
[ref]   When a user must temporarily leave an account logged-in, screen locking should be employed to prevent passersby from abusing the account. User education and training is particularly important for screen locking to be effective, and policies can be implemented to reinforce this.

Automatic screen locking is only meant as a safeguard for those cases where a user forgot to lock the screen.
Group   Configure Console Screen Locking   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   A console screen locking mechanism is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operation system session prior to vacating the vicinity, operating systems need to be able to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock.

Rule   Install the screen Package   [ref]

To enable console screen locking, install the screen package. The screen package can be installed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf install screen
Instruct users to begin new terminal sessions with the following command: 
$ screen
The console can now be locked with the following key combination: 
ctrl+a x
Rationale:
A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operation system session prior to vacating the vicinity, operating systems need to be able to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock.

The screen package allows for a session lock to be implemented and configured.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_screen_installed
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 15, 16, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.10, CCI-000057, CCI-000058, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CM-6(a), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010, SRG-OS-000030-VMM-000110


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable
include install_screen

class install_screen {
  package { 'screen':
    ensure => 'installed',
  }
}

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable

package --add=screen



[[packages]]
name = "screen"
version = "*"

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable
- name: Ensure screen is installed
  package:
    name: screen
    state: present
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_screen_installed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then

if ! rpm -q --quiet "screen" ; then
    dnf install -y "screen"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Disable debug-shell SystemD Service   [ref]

SystemD's debug-shell service is intended to diagnose SystemD related boot issues with various systemctl commands. Once enabled and following a system reboot, the root shell will be available on tty9 which is access by pressing CTRL-ALT-F9. The debug-shell service should only be used for SystemD related issues and should otherwise be disabled.

By default, the debug-shell SystemD service is already disabled. The debug-shell service can be disabled with the following command: 
$ sudo systemctl mask --now debug-shell.service
Rationale:
This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security on the machine through valid troubleshooting configurations and gaining root access when the system is rebooted.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_service_debug-shell_disabled
Identifiers and References

References:  3.4.5, CCI-000366, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii), CM-6, FIA_UAU.1, SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:enable
include disable_debug-shell

class disable_debug-shell {
  service {'debug-shell':
    enable => false,
    ensure => 'stopped',
  }
}


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    systemd:
      units:
      - enabled: false
        name: debug-shell.service



[customizations.services]
disabled = ["debug-shell"]

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:disable
- name: Disable service debug-shell
  block:

  - name: Disable service debug-shell
    systemd:
      name: debug-shell.service
      enabled: 'no'
      state: stopped
      masked: 'yes'
    ignore_errors: 'yes'
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_debug-shell_disabled

- name: Unit Socket Exists - debug-shell.socket
  command: systemctl list-unit-files debug-shell.socket
  register: socket_file_exists
  changed_when: false
  ignore_errors: true
  check_mode: false
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_debug-shell_disabled

- name: Disable socket debug-shell
  systemd:
    name: debug-shell.socket
    enabled: 'no'
    state: stopped
    masked: 'yes'
  when:
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - '"debug-shell.socket" in socket_file_exists.stdout_lines[1]'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_debug-shell_disabled

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then

SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'debug-shell.service'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'debug-shell.service'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'debug-shell.service'
# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it
if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files debug-shell.socket; then
    "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'debug-shell.socket'
    "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'debug-shell.socket'
fi
# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed,
# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass.
# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though.
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'debug-shell.service' || true

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled   [ref]

Fedora systems support an "interactive boot" option that can be used to prevent services from being started. On a Fedora system, interactive boot can be enabled by providing a 1, yes, true, or on value to the systemd.confirm_spawn kernel argument in /etc/default/grub. Remove any instance of 
systemd.confirm_spawn=(1|yes|true|on)
from the kernel arguments in that file to disable interactive boot. Recovery booting must also be disabled. Confirm that GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true is set in /etc/default/grub. It is also required to change the runtime configuration, run: 
/sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn"
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
Rationale:
Using interactive or recovery boot, the console user could disable auditing, firewalls, or other services, weakening system security.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_grub2_disable_interactive_boot
Identifiers and References

References:  11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03, DSS06.06, 3.1.2, 3.4.5, CCI-000213, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii), 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5, SC-2(1), CM-6(a), PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.PT-3, FIA_UAU.1, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1)
  - grub2_disable_interactive_boot
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Verify GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/default/grub
    regexp: ^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*
    line: GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true
    state: present
  when: '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1)
  - grub2_disable_interactive_boot
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled in /etc/default/grub
  replace:
    dest: /etc/default/grub
    regexp: systemd.confirm_spawn(=(1|yes|true|on)|\b)
    replace: systemd.confirm_spawn=no
  when: '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1)
  - grub2_disable_interactive_boot
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled (runtime)
  command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn"
  when: '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1)
  - grub2_disable_interactive_boot
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Regen grub.cfg handle updated GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY and confirm_spawn
  command: grub2-mkconfig -o  /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  when: '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1)
  - grub2_disable_interactive_boot
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; then

# Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled in /etc/default/grub
CONFIRM_SPAWN_YES="systemd.confirm_spawn\(=\(1\|yes\|true\|on\)\|\b\)"
CONFIRM_SPAWN_NO="systemd.confirm_spawn=no"

if grep -q "\(GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX\|GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT\)" /etc/default/grub
then
	sed -i "s/${CONFIRM_SPAWN_YES}/${CONFIRM_SPAWN_NO}/" /etc/default/grub
fi

# make sure GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true
if grep -q '^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*'  '/etc/default/grub' ; then
       # modify the GRUB command-line if an GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY= arg already exists
       sed -i 's/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true/' /etc/default/grub
else
       # no GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=arg is present, append it to file
       echo "GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true"  >> '/etc/default/grub'
fi



# Remove 'systemd.confirm_spawn' kernel argument also from runtime settings
/sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn"


#Regen grub.cfg handle updated GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY and confirm_spawn
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Require Authentication for Single User Mode   [ref]

Single-user mode is intended as a system recovery method, providing a single user root access to the system by providing a boot option at startup.

By default, single-user mode is protected by requiring a password and is set in /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service.
Rationale:
This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security on the machine and gaining root access. Such accesses are further prevented by configuring the bootloader password.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_require_singleuser_auth
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.06, DSS06.10, 3.1.1, 3.4.5, CCI-000213, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii), 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, 0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, A.18.1.4, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5, CIP-003-8 R5.1.1, CIP-003-8 R5.3, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-004-6 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.2, CIP-007-3 R5.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.1, CIP-007-3 R5.3.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.3, IA-2, AC-3, CM-6(a), PR.AC-1, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.PT-3, FIA_UAU.1, SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: require single user mode password
  lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service
    regexp: ^#?ExecStart=
    line: ExecStart=-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell rescue
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-2
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - require_singleuser_auth
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then

service_file="/usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service"

sulogin="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell rescue"

if grep "^ExecStart=.*" "$service_file" ; then
    sed -i "s%^ExecStart=.*%ExecStart=-$sulogin%" "$service_file"
else
    echo "ExecStart=-$sulogin" >> "$service_file"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi
Group   Protect Accounts by Restricting Password-Based Login   Group contains 1 group and 1 rule
[ref]   Conventionally, Unix shell accounts are accessed by providing a username and password to a login program, which tests these values for correctness using the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files. Password-based login is vulnerable to guessing of weak passwords, and to sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks against passwords entered over a network or at an insecure console. Therefore, mechanisms for accessing accounts by entering usernames and passwords should be restricted to those which are operationally necessary.
Group   Verify Proper Storage and Existence of Password Hashes   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   By default, password hashes for local accounts are stored in the second field (colon-separated) in /etc/shadow. This file should be readable only by processes running with root credentials, preventing users from casually accessing others' password hashes and attempting to crack them. However, it remains possible to misconfigure the system and store password hashes in world-readable files such as /etc/passwd, or to even store passwords themselves in plaintext on the system. Using system-provided tools for password change/creation should allow administrators to avoid such misconfiguration.

Rule   Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password   [ref]

If an account is configured for password authentication but does not have an assigned password, it may be possible to log into the account without authentication. Remove any instances of the nullok in /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth to prevent logins with empty passwords.
Warning:  If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will be shown in the remediation report. Note that this rule is not applicable for systems running within a container. Having user with empty password within a container is not considered a risk, because it should not be possible to directly login into a container anyway.
Rationale:
If an account has an empty password, anyone could log in and run commands with the privileges of that account. Accounts with empty passwords should never be used in operational environments.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_no_empty_passwords
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5, 5.5.2, APO01.06, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.02, DSS06.03, DSS06.10, 3.1.1, 3.1.5, CCI-000366, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii), 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 5.2, A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.18.1.4, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5, IA-5(1)(a), IA-5(c), CM-6(a), PR.AC-1, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.DS-5, FIA_UAU.1, Req-8.2.3, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,%23%20Generated%20by%20authselect%20on%20Sat%20Oct%2027%2014%3A59%3A36%202018%0A%23%20Do%20not%20modify%20this%20file%20manually.%0A%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_env.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_faildelay.so%20delay%3D2000000%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_fprintd.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20try_first_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet_success%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20forward_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3C%201000%20quiet%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3Dbad%20success%3Dok%20user_unknown%3Dignore%5D%20pam_sss.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_permit.so%0A%0Apassword%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_pwquality.so%20try_first_pass%20local_users_only%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20sha512%20shadow%20try_first_pass%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_keyinit.so%20revoke%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_limits.so%0A-session%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_systemd.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20%5Bsuccess%3D1%20default%3Dignore%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20service%20in%20crond%20quiet%20use_uid%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth
        overwrite: true
      - contents:
          source: data:,%23%20Generated%20by%20authselect%20on%20Sat%20Oct%2027%2014%3A59%3A36%202018%0A%23%20Do%20not%20modify%20this%20file%20manually.%0A%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_env.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_faildelay.so%20delay%3D2000000%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_fprintd.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20try_first_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet_success%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20forward_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3C%201000%20quiet%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3Dbad%20success%3Dok%20user_unknown%3Dignore%5D%20pam_sss.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_permit.so%0A%0Apassword%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_pwquality.so%20try_first_pass%20local_users_only%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20sha512%20shadow%20try_first_pass%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_keyinit.so%20revoke%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_limits.so%0A-session%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_systemd.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20%5Bsuccess%3D1%20default%3Dignore%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20service%20in%20crond%20quiet%20use_uid%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Strategy:configure
- name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Check if system relies on
    authselect
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /usr/bin/authselect
  register: result_authselect_present
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - configure_strategy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_empty_passwords
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Remediate using authselect
  block:

  - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Check integrity of authselect
      current profile
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect check
    register: result_authselect_check_cmd
    changed_when: false
    ignore_errors: true

  - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Informative message based
      on the authselect integrity check result
    ansible.builtin.assert:
      that:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      fail_msg:
      - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
      - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not
        selected or the selected profile is not intact.
      - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
        is available.
      - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand,
        a custom authselect profile is recommended.
      success_msg:
      - authselect integrity check passed

  - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Get authselect current features
    ansible.builtin.shell:
      cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
    register: result_authselect_features
    changed_when: false
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

  - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Ensure "without-nullok"
      feature is enabled using authselect tool
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect enable-feature without-nullok
    register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd
    when:
    - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
    - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("without-nullok")

  - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Ensure authselect changes
      are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped
    - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success
  when:
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - configure_strategy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_empty_passwords
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Remediate directly editing
    PAM files
  ansible.builtin.replace:
    dest: '{{ item }}'
    regexp: nullok
  loop:
  - /etc/pam.d/system-auth
  - /etc/pam.d/password-auth
  when:
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.5.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - configure_strategy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_empty_passwords
  - no_reboot_needed

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then

if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
    if ! authselect check; then
echo "
authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
exit 1
fi
authselect enable-feature without-nullok

authselect apply-changes -b
else
    
if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then
    sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
fi
    
if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then
    sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
fi
    
if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"; then
    sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"
fi
    
if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"; then
    sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"
fi
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi
Group   Secure Session Configuration Files for Login Accounts   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   When a user logs into a Unix account, the system configures the user's session by reading a number of files. Many of these files are located in the user's home directory, and may have weak permissions as a result of user error or misconfiguration. If an attacker can modify or even read certain types of account configuration information, they can often gain full access to the affected user's account. Therefore, it is important to test and correct configuration file permissions for interactive accounts, particularly those of privileged users such as root or system administrators.

Rule   Set Interactive Session Timeout   [ref]

Setting the TMOUT option in /etc/profile ensures that all user sessions will terminate based on inactivity. The value of TMOUT should be exported and read only. The TMOUT setting in a file loaded by /etc/profile, e.g. /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh should read as follows: 
declare -xr TMOUT=600
Rationale:
Terminating an idle session within a short time period reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a management session enabled on the console or console port that has been left unattended.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_tmout
Identifiers and References

References:  BP28(R29), 1, 12, 15, 16, DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10, 3.1.11, CCI-000057, CCI-001133, CCI-002361, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.1, CIP-007-3 R5.3.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.3, AC-12, SC-10, AC-2(5), CM-6(a), PR.AC-7, FMT_MOF_EXT.1, Req-8.6.1, SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072, SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010, SRG-OS-000163-VMM-000700, SRG-OS-000279-VMM-001010


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Strategy:restrict
- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_tmout # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_accounts_tmout: !!str 600
  tags:
    - always

- name: Correct any occurrence of TMOUT in /etc/profile
  replace:
    path: /etc/profile
    regexp: ^[^#].*TMOUT=.*
    replace: declare -xr TMOUT={{ var_accounts_tmout }}
  register: profile_replaced
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.11
  - NIST-800-53-AC-12
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-10
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.6.1
  - accounts_tmout
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set Interactive Session Timeout
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh
    create: true
    regexp: TMOUT=
    line: declare -xr TMOUT={{ var_accounts_tmout }}
    state: present
  when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.11
  - NIST-800-53-AC-12
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-10
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.6.1
  - accounts_tmout
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then

var_accounts_tmout='600'


# if 0, no occurence of tmout found, if 1, occurence found
tmout_found=0


for f in /etc/profile /etc/profile.d/*.sh; do

    if grep --silent '^[^#].*TMOUT' $f; then
        sed -i -E "s/^(.*)TMOUT\s*=\s*(\w|\$)*(.*)$/declare -xr TMOUT=$var_accounts_tmout\3/g" $f
        tmout_found=1
    fi
done

if [ $tmout_found -eq 0 ]; then
        echo -e "\n# Set TMOUT to $var_accounts_tmout per security requirements" >> /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh
        echo "declare -xr TMOUT=$var_accounts_tmout" >> /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi
Group   System Accounting with auditd   Group contains 9 groups and 111 rules
[ref]   The audit service provides substantial capabilities for recording system activities. By default, the service audits about SELinux AVC denials and certain types of security-relevant events such as system logins, account modifications, and authentication events performed by programs such as sudo. Under its default configuration, auditd has modest disk space requirements, and should not noticeably impact system performance.

NOTE: The Linux Audit daemon auditd can be configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules files (*.rules) located in /etc/audit/rules.d location and compile them to create the resulting form of the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during the daemon startup (default configuration). Alternatively, the auditd daemon can use the auditctl utility to read audit rules from the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during daemon startup, and load them into the kernel. The expected behavior is configured via the appropriate ExecStartPost directive setting in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. To instruct the auditd daemon to use the augenrules program to read audit rules (default configuration), use the following setting: 
ExecStartPost=-/sbin/augenrules --load
in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. In order to instruct the auditd daemon to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules, use the following setting: 
ExecStartPost=-/sbin/auditctl -R /etc/audit/audit.rules
in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. Refer to [Service] section of the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file for further details.

Government networks often have substantial auditing requirements and auditd can be configured to meet these requirements. Examining some example audit records demonstrates how the Linux audit system satisfies common requirements. The following example from Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Documentation available at https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html-single/selinux_users_and_administrators_guide/index#sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Fixing_Problems-Raw_Audit_Messages shows the substantial amount of information captured in a two typical "raw" audit messages, followed by a breakdown of the most important fields. In this example the message is SELinux-related and reports an AVC denial (and the associated system call) that occurred when the Apache HTTP Server attempted to access the /var/www/html/file1 file (labeled with the samba_share_t type): 
type=AVC msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): avc:  denied  { getattr } for pid=2465 comm="httpd"
path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0 ino=284133 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): arch=40000003 syscall=196 success=no exit=-13
a0=b98df198 a1=bfec85dc a2=54dff4 a3=2008171 items=0 ppid=2463 pid=2465 auid=502 uid=48
gid=48 euid=48 suid=48 fsuid=48 egid=48 sgid=48 fsgid=48 tty=(none) ses=6 comm="httpd"
exe="/usr/sbin/httpd" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 key=(null)
  • msg=audit(1226874073.147:96)
    • The number in parentheses is the unformatted time stamp (Epoch time) for the event, which can be converted to standard time by using the date command.
  • { getattr }
    • The item in braces indicates the permission that was denied. getattr indicates the source process was trying to read the target file's status information. This occurs before reading files. This action is denied due to the file being accessed having the wrong label. Commonly seen permissions include getattr, read, and write.
  • comm="httpd"
    • The executable that launched the process. The full path of the executable is found in the exe= section of the system call (SYSCALL) message, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd".
  • path="/var/www/html/file1"
    • The path to the object (target) the process attempted to access.
  • scontext="unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0"
    • The SELinux context of the process that attempted the denied action. In this case, it is the SELinux context of the Apache HTTP Server, which is running in the httpd_t domain.
  • tcontext="unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0"
    • The SELinux context of the object (target) the process attempted to access. In this case, it is the SELinux context of file1. Note: the samba_share_t type is not accessible to processes running in the httpd_t domain.
  • From the system call (SYSCALL) message, two items are of interest:
    • success=no: indicates whether the denial (AVC) was enforced or not. success=no indicates the system call was not successful (SELinux denied access). success=yes indicates the system call was successful - this can be seen for permissive domains or unconfined domains, such as initrc_t and kernel_t.
    • exe="/usr/sbin/httpd": the full path to the executable that launched the process, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd".
Group   Configure auditd Rules for Comprehensive Auditing   Group contains 7 groups and 100 rules
[ref]   The auditd program can perform comprehensive monitoring of system activity. This section describes recommended configuration settings for comprehensive auditing, but a full description of the auditing system's capabilities is beyond the scope of this guide. The mailing list linux-audit@redhat.com exists to facilitate community discussion of the auditing system.

The audit subsystem supports extensive collection of events, including:
  • Tracing of arbitrary system calls (identified by name or number) on entry or exit.
  • Filtering by PID, UID, call success, system call argument (with some limitations), etc.
  • Monitoring of specific files for modifications to the file's contents or metadata.

Auditing rules at startup are controlled by the file /etc/audit/audit.rules. Add rules to it to meet the auditing requirements for your organization. Each line in /etc/audit/audit.rules represents a series of arguments that can be passed to auditctl and can be individually tested during runtime. See documentation in /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION and in the related man pages for more details.

If copying any example audit rulesets from /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION, be sure to comment out the lines containing arch= which are not appropriate for your system's architecture. Then review and understand the following rules, ensuring rules are activated as needed for the appropriate architecture.

After reviewing all the rules, reading the following sections, and editing as needed, the new rules can be activated as follows: 
$ sudo service auditd restart
Group   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls   Group contains 13 rules
[ref]   At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. Note that the "-F arch=b32" lines should be present even on a 64 bit system. These commands identify system calls for auditing. Even if the system is 64 bit it can still execute 32 bit system calls. Additionally, these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. An example of this is that the "-S" calls could be split up and placed on separate lines, however, this is less efficient. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown,fchown,fchownat,lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If your system is 64 bit then these lines should be duplicated and the arch=b32 replaced with arch=b64 as follows: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,fchownat,lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmod   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 5.4.1.1, APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01, 3.1.7, CCI-000126, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-000172, CCI-002884, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e), 4.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4, SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6, A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, AU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a), DE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4, FAU_GEN.1.1.c, Req-10.5.5, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000458-VMM-001810, SRG-OS-000474-VMM-001940


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit chmod tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="chmod"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()



# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chown   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 5.4.1.1, APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01, 3.1.7, CCI-000126, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-000172, CCI-002884, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e), 4.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4, SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6, A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, AU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a), DE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4, FAU_GEN.1.1.c, Req-10.5.5, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219, SRG-OS-000458-VMM-001810, SRG-OS-000474-VMM-001940


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit chown tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="chown"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()



# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmod   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 5.4.1.1, APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01, 3.1.7, CCI-000126, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-000172, CCI-002884, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e), 4.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4, SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6, A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, AU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a), DE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4, FAU_GEN.1.1.c, Req-10.5.5, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000458-VMM-001810, SRG-OS-000474-VMM-001940


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit fchmod tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="fchmod"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()



# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodat   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 5.4.1.1, APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01, 3.1.7, CCI-000126, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-000172, CCI-002884, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e), 4.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4, SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6, A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, AU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a), DE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4, FAU_GEN.1.1.c, Req-10.5.5, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000458-VMM-001810, SRG-OS-000474-VMM-001940


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit fchmodat tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmodat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmodat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmodat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmodat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy


# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="fchmodat"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()



# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchown   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
Identifiers and References

References:  1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 5.4.1.1, APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01, 3.1.7, CCI-000126, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-000172, CCI-002884, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e), 4.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4, SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6, A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, AU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a), DE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4, FAU_GEN.1.1.c, Req-10.5.5, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219, SRG-OS-000458-VMM-001810, SRG-OS-000474-VMM-001940


Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit fchown tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy


# Rem